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Recent corporate scandals reveal opposing perspectives on the 
ability of rank-and-file employees to be corporate monitors. From 
one perspective, the scandals demonstrate employees' efficacy as 
monitors with accurate insider knowledge about the inner workings 
of their corporations. At great risk to their careers, a few employee 
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whistleblowers bravely attempted to expose wrongdoing at many 
corporations involved in recent scandals, such as Enron, Worldcorn, 
Global Crossing, and several mutual fund companies.' 
Viewed differently, however, the scandals also illustrate the 
difficulty of relying upon employees to function as effective 
corporate monitors. The financial misconduct at Enron and other 
companies lasted for years before being revealed p~bl ic ly .~  Countless 
lower-level employees necessarily knew about, were exposed to, or 
were involved superficially in the wrongdoing and its concealment, 
but few disclosed it, either to company officials or to the public.3 
Thus, while the corporate scandals demonstrate employees' potential 
to monitor corporations, they also confirm that this potential often is 
not fully realized. 
The most recent attempt to encourage employees to become 
more effective corporate monitors is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, passed by Congress in response to corporate  scandal^.^ The 
Act utilizes two approaches to encourage corporate whistle blower^.^ 
1. See discussion i n p a  Part 1I.B. 
2. For example, immediately prior to declaring bankruptcy in December 2001, Enron 
restated its earnings for each year between 1997 through 2001 because of the accounting 
problems that occurred during that time. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
OF ENRON COW. 2, 32 (2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicrepo~/ 
sicreport020102.pdf. 
3. See discussion i n p a  Part 1I.B; cf: Rebecca Goodell, The Ethics Resource Center's 
Survey of Ethics Practices and Employee Perceptions, in  CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: 
STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND 
SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 159, 160 (1995) 
[hereinafter GOOD CITIZEN] (presenting survey result that one in three employees witnessed 
significant corporate misconduct). Of course, many employees worked at these corporations 
without any reason to  suspect wrongdoing. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE 
SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 239 
(2003). Rather than focus on these employees, this Article is concerned with employees who 
have reason t o  suspect fraudulent conduct but do nothing about it. 
4.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 1 5  & 18 U.S.C.). 
5. A third model, the Bounty Model, has proven to be a particularly effective means of 
encouraging whistleblowing by giving financial incentives to whistleblowers. See Elletta 
Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for 
Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 278-82 (1992) (listing 
examples of various rewards to whistleblowers provided by federal and state statutes). The 
Bounty Model, however, is not extensively applied to  encourage the reporting of fraud against 
corporations themselves (as opposed to fraud against the government) and, unlike the two 
models discussed in this Article, was not implemented in response to the corporate scandals. 
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The first is best described as a version of the well-known Anti- 
retaliation Model, which involves protecting whistleblowers from 
employer retaliation after they disclose ~ r o n ~ d o i n g . ~  The second 
approach, labeled in this Article as the Structural Model, requires 
that corporations provide employees with a standardized channel to 
report organizational misconduct internally within the c~rporat ion.~ 
While academic and public attention has focused almost 
exclusively on Sarbanes-Oxley's version of the Anti-retaliation 
Model: this Article is the first comprehensive academic work to 
analyze the ability of Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to engage 
corporate employees in the battle to reduce corporate fraud. 
Utilizing social science research that analyzes whistleblower 
motivations, I conclude that the Structural Model may produce 
more effective disclosures from whistleblowing employees than prior 
attempts to encourage whistleblowing because the Model addresses 
two significant problems that previously kept employees from 
consistently functioning as successhl corporate monitors: (1) the 
corporate norm of silence, and (2) the corporate tradition of 
blocking and filtering employee whistleblowing. 
Accordingly, although it is an intriguing idea that deserves hrther study, applying the Bounty 
Model to prevent fraud against corporations is beyond the scope of this Article. 
6. See MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 232 (1992); 
Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Teny Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower 
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99,100 (2000); Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 273-78. 
7. The structure of the channel can be fairly simple, such as designating an internal 
officer to receive such reports or setting up a "hotline" for employees to call. Organizations 
also might install more complex reporting systems, complete with ombudsmen who handle 
employee reports, ensure anonymity for the employees, investigate their concerns, and provide 
employees feedback on the outcome of the investigations. See, ea.,  Marlene Wifield, 
Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in WHISTLEBLOWIN~UBVERSION OR CORPORATE 
CITIZENSHIP? 21, 24 (Gerald Vinten ed., 1994) (describing the ombudsmen system 
implemented by Otis Elevator Company); Alan R Yuspeh, Sharing uBest Practices" 
Information, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 84. 
8. See, ea., STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER h W :  A GUIDE TO LEGAL 
PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES (2004); Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and 
Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 875 (2002); Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the 
Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for 
Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004); Robert G. Vaughn, America's First 
Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2005); 
Ashlea Ebeling, Blowing the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistle, FORBES.COM, June 18, 2003, 
http://www.forbes.com/2003/06/18/cx~ae~0618beltway~print.html. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW r2006 
The Article begins by explaining the background of recent 
corporate scandals and the two whistleblower models found in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The specific examples from recent corporate 
scandals set forth in Part I1 of the Article illustrate the two problems 
that relate to the flow of employees' inside knowledge of 
wrongdoing. Part I1 first discusses how, during the scandals, 
employee information about wrongdoing did not flow readily. 
Despite having inside knowledge about corporate misconduct, 
employees rarely spoke out about wrongdoing because of a 
compelling norm of silence among employees.9 Second, Part I1 
addresses how on the rare occasion when employees spoke out, 
corporate executives typically blocked or filtered the information 
provided by employees before it reached traditional corporate 
monitors, such as the board of directors or the government. While a 
few "successful" whistleblowers overcame these two problems, 
thousands of other rank-and-file employees did not. 
Part I11 of the Article describes the two approaches utilized by 
Sarbanes-Oxley to address these problems-the Anti-retaliation 
Model and the Structural Model. Ultimately, the Anti-retaliation 
Model implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley is not sufficient alone to 
address these flow-of-information difficulties. By contrast, Sarbanes- 
Oxley's Structural Model offers significant improvements over 
versions of the Structural Model utilized prior to recent corporate 
scandals. Namely, the Act requires that corporate boards of public 
companies establish avenues (i.e., structures) for employees to report 
wrongdoing directly to independent directors on the board's audit 
committee-not to corporate exec~tives.'~ Furthermore, Sarbanes- 
Oxley made the implementation of this disclosure channel 
mandatory." 
Social science research can provide a framework for analyzing the 
effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model. Accordingly, Part 
IV of the Article evaluates Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model 
through this lens and suggests that it is more likely than the Anti- 
retaliation Model to reduce the flow-of-information problems that 
9. See, ea.,  Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. 
L.J. 101, 119-23 (1995); Terance D. Miethe & Joyce Rothschild, Whistleblowing and the 
Control of Organization Misconduct, 64 SOC. INQUIRY 322,332-37 (1994) (finding low levels 
of whistleblowing after discovery of misconduct). 
10. SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15  U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(A) (Supp. 2002). 
11. See id. 
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contributed to recent corporate scandals because the Structural 
Model provides a direct and legitimate disclosure channel from 
employees to the board of directors. The Structural Model 
encourages more whistleblowing because it provides incentives to 
increase employee participation as corporate monitors and reduces 
various disincentives to employee whistleblo~ing. '~ Equally 
important, this direct channel to the board should encourage 
effective whistleblowing by circumventing information blocking and 
filtering by corporate executives.13 In this way, Sarbanes-Oxley's 
Structural Model minimizes the principal-agent problem that arises 
when employees provide information about misconduct to mid-level 
managers and corporate executives who cover-up or ignore the 
fraud. Furthermore, the model should provide several secondary 
benefits to corporations and their employees, such as improving 
corporate decision-making, reducing monitoring costs, and 
increasing employee voice within the corporation. Such benefits may 
lead to greater acceptance and implementation than pre-scandal 
attempts to encourage whistle blower^.'^ 
Although it is an improvement over prior approaches, Sarbanes- 
Oxley's Structural Model still suffers from significant flaws. Thus, the 
Article concludes in Part V by explaining the inadequacies of 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model and offering several suggestions 
for improvement. One problem is that the Model may not work well 
enough. That is, corporations may implement disclosure channels 
that appear sound on paper but do  not work in reality.15 This 
"cheating" problem can be addressed in several ways. First, 
corporations could disclose information regarding their 
whistleblower system. For example, corporations might publicize the 
structure of their whistleblower disclosure model in order to advise 
shareholders and employees of the extent of their system. Similarly, 
corporations could be required to disclose various metrics regarding 
the effectiveness of their disclosure channel, such as the number and 
type of complaints and the resolution of those complaints. 
Shareholders, employees, and government regulators could evaluate 
the effectiveness of a whistleblower disclosure system through these 
12. See discussion infia Part N . A .  
13. See discussion infra Part N.B.  
14. See discussion infin Part N.C. 
15. See discussion infia Part V.B. 
disclosures. A second way to address the cheating problem is to 
provide corporations with a true incentive to create effective 
whistleblower systems by permitting a limited safe harbor for 
corporations that implement verifiably effective whistleblower 
channels prior to any wrongdoing. 
The converse of the cheating problem presents another potential 
difficulty: the model may work too well. Complaints from employees 
may overwhelm directors and prevent them from efficiently and 
sufficiently addressing the complaints, much less attending to their 
obligation to oversee the business of the company.16 Addressing this 
"noise" problem may require the SEC to promulgate regulations 
that reduce the burden on directors, while still requiring director 
oversight of the information obtained through a whistleblower 
disclosure channel. For example, the SEC may explicitly permit 
directors to outsource initial review of such disclosures to ethics 
officers or third-parties that report directly to the board rather than 
to corporate executives. Approving sufficient, but limited, 
whistleblower structures through regulation may prevent 
corporations from implementing inefficient and cumbersome systems 
in order to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley's vague mandate. 
Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model is an 
improvement over prior attempts to encourage whistleblowing 
because the Act requires a structure that will encourage 
whistleblowers and help them effectively provide information about 
wrongdoing to corporate officers with the power to address the 
misconduct. But, in its current form, Sarbanes-Oxley fails to properly 
balance the need for employees to disclose important inside 
knowledge to independent directors with the need for directors to 
efficiently and effectively monitor all aspects of a corporation's 
business. 
16. See discussion inpa Part V.C. 
11 12 
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11. THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE MORE EFFECTIVE 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
A. Information Problems and Traditional Corporate Monitors 
Effective corporate monitoring benefits corporate shareholders 
and employees, as well as the general public.17 Traditional 
monitoring occurs through a variety of overlapping means. A board 
of directors monitors a corporation's professional management on 
behalf of the shareholders, who are too dispersed and diverse to 
monitor management themselves.18 Professional corporate 
  gatekeeper^,^' such as auditors and attorneys, provide outside 
monitoring of corporations that protects shareholders as well as the 
investing public.19 Further, the government monitors companies 
through government inspectors and by requiring various corporate 
reports to be filed.20 
A primary advantage of each of these traditional corporate 
monitors is that they are external to the company. Independent 
directors purportedly provide dispassionate oversight of 
management.21 Gatekeepers have reputational concerns outside of 
17. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christine J. Johnson, Managerialism, Lgal Ethics, 
and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 316; Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of k g a l  Controh, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 863 (1984); 
Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279,280-85. 
18. See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on 
the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495,498 & 
n.14 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron's 
Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions, 71 U .  CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1170- 
74 (2003); Ribstein, supra note 17, at 285. 
19. See, eg., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-10 (2004); Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 
(1986). 
20. See, eg.,  15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. 2002) (requiring public companies to make 
periodic filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission). Government-like entities, such 
as various securities listing agencies like the New York Stock Exchange, also monitor 
corporations. 
21. Director independence can enhance the objectivity of the board because 
independent directors are not as dependent on short-term corporate results to maintain their 
position with the corporation. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal 
Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 244-50 (1997); Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better 
Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate hga l  Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 
1237 n.lOO (2000). Moreover, independent directors may be more willing to disclose 
their contractual relationship with corporations to inspire them to 
provide effective monitoring.22 When the government enforces laws 
and regulations, accountability to the public at large keeps regulators 
from being influenced by the corporation's own goals. 
Despite the advantage of external monitors, however, their 
external position presents a significant challenge: monitoring the 
inner workings of a company from the outside.23 External monitors 
must rely upon information they receive from corporate executives to 
fulfill their monitoring Even under the best 
circumstances, this information is certain to be incomplete and self- 
serving due to information blocking and filtering by executives and 
subordinate managers.25 Under the worst circumstances, corporate 
wrongdoing publicly because they can d o  so without losing their employment. See Eisenberg, 
strpra, at 2 4 4 4 8 ;  Kostant, supra, at 1237 n.lOO. 
22. See, ea., Coffee, supra note 19, at 308; Kraakman, supra note 19, at 61 n.20,94. 
23. See Kostant, supra note 21, at 1239-40. For example, the independence of a 
director may only exacerbate the informational asymmetries that already exist. Outside 
directors "devote but a small portion of their time and effort to  the firm." Bainbridge & 
Johnson, supra note 17, at 310; see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of 
Groupthink, 71 U .  CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2003) (noting that directors have information 
gathering problems because they only meet a few times a year). Therefore, they can have 
difficulty undersanding the inner workings of the company they are charged with monitoring. 
See Eliot Spitzer, Keynote Address, Symposium: Enron and Its Aftermath, 76 S T .  JOHN'S L. REV. 
801,807 (2002). 
24. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner 
Circles, 83  OR. L. REV. 435, 460 (2004); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and 
Informational Monopolies, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313,1349-50 (2005). 
25. Information blocking and filtering occurs when information is withheld by 
subordinates, and "communication upward [is] highly filtered and correspondingly 
inaccurate." John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of 
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective hgal  Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1144 (1977) 
(quoting R Lier t ,  A Motivational Approach to a Modtped Theory of Organization and 
Management, ia MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY 184, 195-96 (M. Haire ed., 1959)); 
Kostant, supra note 21, a t  1239-40. This blocking and filtering has numerous causes, 
including: 
(a) a shared feeling on the part of subordinate officials that they owe their loyalty 
chiefly to senior management and not to  the board; (b) a belief that the board is 
interested only in "hard" quantitative information, such as capital costs, financial 
ratios, and expected rates of return; (c) a sense that "everybody knows anyway," 
coupled with the perception that the board would rather not be put on formal 
notice as to the ugly "facts of life" of doing business abroad; and (d) a "lack of 
congruence" between the interests of the corporation and the career aspirations of 
individual corporate officials. 
Coffee, supra, at 1131; see also Linda Klebe Trevino, Out of Touch: The CEO's Role in 
Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1209-10 (2005) (describing research 
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executives may &rmatively hide or misrepresent information in 
order to evade a monitor's oversight. Thus, flow-of-information 
problems can arise because these traditional corporate monitors do 
not have enough information, and the information that they do have 
is often distorted and filtered. 
These problems contributed to the failure of traditional monitors 
to detect the wrongdoing at the center of recent corporate 
scandals.26 Certainly the greed of corporate executives triggered the 
massive fraud:' and traditional corporate monitors should have been 
more active in their oversight respon~ibilities.~~ Other systemic issues 
also contributed to this unprecedented failure in corporate 
governance, such as internal incentives to inflate stock prices caused 
by managerial stock options.29 There is sufficient blame to go 
around.30 However, as discussed below, one of the most glaring-yet 
regarding the distortion and filtering of information from subordinates to superiors in 
hierarchical organizations). 
26. The failings of the traditional monitors in these scandals, particularly with regard to 
Enron, have been exhaustively detailed elsewhere. See, ea., Coffee, supra note 19, at 313-15; 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1 1 2 5 4 3  (2003); John R Kroger, Enron, Fraud, 
and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U .  COLO. L. REV. 57, 59-60 
(2005). 
27. See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 280-81; Greg Ip, Greenspan Issues Hopeful Outlook as 
Stocbs Sink, WALL S T .  J., July 17, 2002, at A1 (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan in a July 16,2002 speech in which Mr. Greenspan blamed an "infectious greedn for 
the corporate scandals); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: 
Lessonsfi.om Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of 
Internal Controls, 93  GEO. L.J. 285, 286 (2004) ("Indeed, unrestrained greed has now 
become the standard trope in the social construction of these events."). 
28. Fanto, supra note 24, at 435-36; O'Connor, supra note 23, at 1235-36; POWERS 
ETAL.,supranote2,at22, 148. 
29. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 304. Other explanations include: a "'bubble' 
atmospheren fueled by new business techniques and a lack of investor skepticism; see Ribstein, 
supra note 17, at 281; the legislative undermining of private securities liability through, among 
other things, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; see andrk douglas pond 
cummings, aAin't No Glory in PainD: How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital 
Markets, 83  NEB. L. REV. 979, 1044 (2005); and a judicial tightening of burdens of proof for 
demonstrating aiding and abetting liability in violation of federal securities law; see cummings, 
supra, at 1023-24, 1048 & n.320 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, N.A., 51 1 U.S. 164 (1994)). 
30. See Kroger, supra note 26; Paredes, supra note 18, at 503 ("Many things 
contributed to  Enron's demise. There were breakdowns all around-accountants, lawyers, 
securities analysts, and credit rating agencies (the 'gatekeepers'); the SEC, and the board of 
directors, not to mention the underlying corporate misconduct. Even the 'victims'--the 
inves torAear  some responsibility for seemingly, perhaps understandably, becoming 
under-analyzed-facts regarding the scandals is that the information 
concerning the fraudulent conduct was available to rank-and-file 
employees for years. Problematically, this information either never 
made it to the traditional corporate monitors or was so filtered that it 
did not inspire any of the monitors to end the misconduct until 
shareholders lost millions of dollars of value in their  investment^.^' 
B. Overcoming Information Problems-Employees as 
Corporate Monitors 
Corporate employees could be instrumental in solving the 
inherent information problems of traditional external corporate 
monitors. Employees have an information advantage over traditional 
corporate monitors because they have more complete knowledge 
regarding the inner workings of a large c ~ r p o r a t i o n . ~ ~  Financial 
misconduct on the scale that occurred during the recent corporate 
scandals necessarily requires the assistance of low- and mid-level 
employees because of its scope and ~omplex i ty .~~  Additionally, even 
if an employee does not participate in the wrongdoing, corporate 
accounting and finance employees, who are trained in the proper 
complacent after historic bull markets and failing to ask the tough questions of Enron's 
management that should have been asked."). 
31. T o  some extent, this problem is not new. During corporate scandals in the 1970s 
relating to corporate bribery of public officials, Professor Coffee noted significant problems 
with information flow to the board of directors. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1127-28. 
Corporate officers systematically kept information about the bribery from the board of 
directors, and the hierarchical structure of the corporation cut off subordinates who attempted 
to  raise red flags. See id. at 1133-34. Writing in the early 1980s, Alan Westin also lamented the 
harmhl results that occurred when corporate management blocked information from 
employees regarding illegalities taking place within the corporation. See Alan F. Westin, 
Introduction to WHISTLE-BLOWING! LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1, 10-12 
(Alan F. Westin ed., 1981). 
32. Although the statement that employees have better information about corporate 
conduct than outside monitors seems rationally based on common sense, Ralph Nader put it 
nicely in his early work on corporate whistleblowers: 
Corporate employees are among the first to  know about industrial dumping of 
mercury or fluoride sludge into waterways, defectively designed automobiles, or 
undisclosed adverse effects of prescription drugs and pesticides. They are the first to 
grasp the technical capabilities to prevent existing product o r  pollution hazards. But 
they are very often the last to  speak out, much less t o  refuse to  be recruited for acts 
of corporate or governmental negligence or predation. 
Ralph Nader, An Anatomy of Whistle Blowing, in WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE 
CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 , 4  (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972). 
33. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U .  L.Q. 357, 374 (2003); Ribstein, supra note 17, at 286. 
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methods of conducting business, should recognize when corporate 
actions fall outside legal b ~ u n d a r i e s . ~ ~  In fact, even with few 
corporate or legal incentives provided to whistleblowing employees, 
roughly one-third of fraud and other economic crimes against 
businesses are reported by whistle blower^.^^ Given their central role 
in corporate activity, information from rank-and-file employees is 
essential to uncovering wrongdoing in a timely manner. Accordingly, 
effectively encouraging employees to disclose their knowledge of 
wrongdoing is a critical step in discovering fraud and other corporate 
misconduct. 
1. The few who succeeded 
Unlike the traditional corporate monitors during the recent 
scandals, some corporate employees successfully identified and 
reported the corporate fraud, particularly at WorldCom, Krnart, and 
several mutual fund companies. These whistleblowing employees 
succeeded for two reasons. First and foremost, they simply spoke out 
and disclosed their inside knowledge regarding the corporate 
misconduct. Second, the successhl whistleblowers spoke out 
eflectively by disclosing their information directly to traditional 
corporate monitors rather than to corporate executives. 
The most famous example of a successhl individual employee 
whistleblower may be Cynthia Cooper, the former head of internal 
auditing at W ~ r l d C o r n . ~ ~  Cooper uncovered a wide variety of illegal 
accounting practices at WorldCom in 2002 and reported the 
illegalities directly to WorldCom's Board of Directors. The Board 
publicly admitted the financial manipulations and fired WorldCom's 
CFO Scott Sullivan, who allegedly orchestrated the fraud and tried 
to stop Cooper's investigation.37 By reporting Sullivan's misconduct 
34. See Richard Alexander, The Role of Whistleblowers in the Fight b a i n s t  Economic 
Crime, 12 J. F I N .  CRIME 131,131 (2004). 
35. See Brickey, supra note 33, at 365 n.37 (citing study reported in Jonathan D .  
Glater, Suwey Finds Fraud's Reach in Big Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 8 ,2003,  at C3). 
36. See Amanda Ripley, The Night Detective, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 45, 46-47. 
Cooper was named, along with Sherron Watkins of Enron, as one of Time Magazine's People 
of the Year in 2002. See Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 
2002, at 31,32-33. 
37. See Ripley, supra note 36, at 49. WorldCom ultimately filed for the largest 
bankruptcy in American history. See Ken Belson, WorldCom's Audacious Failure and Its Toll on 
an Zndumy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,2005, at C1. 
directly to the Board, Cooper successfully avoided Sullivan's attempt 
to block disclosure of the fraud.38 
Other whistleblowers were similarly effective because they 
disclosed information directly to the government, another traditional 
corporate monitor.39 For example, separate, anonymous 
whistleblowers brought to light fraud at Symbol Technologies and 
Krnart when they sent letters to government reg~lators.~' More 
recently, the mutual fund industry paid hundreds of millions of 
dollars to settle charges arising out of allegations made by employee 
whistleblowers to government investigators regarding improper 
practices in the ind~st ry .~ '  
38. Ethics hotlines also helped whistleblowers succeed. At Duke Power, a call from an 
employee whistleblower to the company's ethics hotline in July 2001 led to the company's 
payment of a $25 million fee to state regulators. See Alix Nyberg Stuart, Whistle-Blower Woes, 
CFO MAG., Oct. 2003, at 51, 52, available at  http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3010455?f 
=related; Melissa Davis, Enron Aside, Whistle-Blowers Still Withering, THE~TREET.COM, ay 
29,2003, hnp://www.thestreet.com/-tscs/ stocks/melissadavid/10090120.html. 
39. T o  be sure, some whistleblowers also were successful because they disclosed 
information directly to  the public, either through the media or an individual lawsuit. For 
example, a former Dynegy employee gave papers about "Project Alphan-a financial vehicle 
implemented by Dynegy to exaggerate cash flow and reduce taxes-to the Wall Street Journal, 
which led to  an SEC civil securities-fraud case that the company settled for $3 million, a 
shareholder lawsuit, and resignations of senior executives. See Jathon Sapsford & Paul Beckett, 
1"histle-Blower Reels fiom Actions' Fnllout, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Dec. 17, 2001, 
http://www.careerjoumal.com/myc/survive/20021217-sapsford.h~l. Also, after receiving 
allegations in a whistleblower lawsuit about marketing fraud related to  its relationship to 
Burger King, the Coca-Cola Company conducted an internal investigation and ultimately 
offered to  pay Burger King $21 million to compensate for the fraud. See Stuart, supra note 38, 
at 52. 
40. In April 2001, an anonymous whistleblower sent a letter to  the SEC alleging that 
Symbol Technologies engaged in improper accounting. After three years of government and 
internal investigations, Symbol restated earnings for five years and the government indicted 
seven former senior executives for accounting fraud. See Steve Lohr, Ex-Executives at  Symbol 
Are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2004, at C1. In its restatements, Symbol reduced revenue 
by $234 million and net income by $325 million. See id. Symbol also settled investor and SEC 
lawsuits for $138 million. See id. In January 2002, an anonymous whistleblower sent a letter 
about corporate wrongdoing to  Kmart's board and to  government officials that resulted in at 
least two criminal indictments, which were allegedly based upon improperly recording 
payments to  overstate Kmart's earnings. See Constance L. Hays, 2 Eeoficials at  Kmart Face 
Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,2003, at C1. 
41. See Jayne O'Donnell, The Guy Who Blew the Whistle on Adtnam, USA TODAY, Nov. 
20, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/funds/2OO3-11-20 
-whistleblower-la-cover-x.htm. Putnam Investments alone paid nearly $194 million to settle 
claims that investors were hurt by the practice of market timing. See Jon Chesto, Mass. Market: 
Whistle-blower Law Needs Updating; No Qne Rewarded in 5-Tear History, PATRIOT LEDGER, 
July 9, 2005, http://1edger.southofboston.com/articles/2005/07/09/news/news06.txt; 60 
Minutes II: Meet a Major-Leagrre Whistleblower (CBS television broadcast Feb. 18, 2004) (text 
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Alone, these whistleblowing employees could not stop corporate 
misconduct; but by providing information directly to traditional 
monitors, the employees circumvented the barriers corporate 
executives erected to shield external monitors from uncovering 
wrongdoing. 
2. The many who failed 
The success of these few individual whistleblowers does not 
indicate that employee whistleblowing worked effectively. Rather, 
the small number of successful whistleblowers highlights the overall 
failure of corporate employees to promptly identi@ and report the 
wrongdoing occurring in these companies and others, such as 
Enron. Employees failed in two respects. First, employees failed to 
speak out; and second, when they did, they failed to effectively 
report the misconduct they witnessed. 
a. Failing to  speak out. Unlike the few successful individual 
whistleblowers, the vast majority of knowledgeable employees failed 
to reveal wrongdoing because they were unable or unwilling to speak 
out. The misconduct at many of the corporations affected by recent 
scandals occurred over a period of several years.42 During this time, 
rank-and-file employees certainly participated, at some level, in the 
improper practices that led to the fraud.43 For example, when 
of interview available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stries/2004/07/07/6OII/pnntable 
628000.shtml). 
42. For example, the fraud at Enron was ongoing for at least four years before the 
company filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 2, 32. 
The amounts involved in the restatement are staggering. As set forth in the Powers Report, the 
restatement 
reduced Enron's reported net income by $28 million in 1997 (of $105 million 
total), by $133 million in 1998 (of $703 million total), by $248 million in 1999 (of 
$893 million total), and by $99 million in 2000 (of $979 million total). The 
restatement reduced reported shareholders' equity by $258 million in 1997, by 
$391 million in 1998, by $710 million in 1999, and by $754 million in 2000. I t  
increased reported debt by $711 million in 1997, by $561 million in 1998, by $685 
million in 1999, and by $628 million in 2000. 
Id. at 3. The HealthSouth fraud may have lasted as long as fifteen years. See Kurt Eichenwald, 
Key Executive at  HealthSouth Admits to Fraud, N.Y.  TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at C1. It "ranks as 
one of the biggest, and perhaps the most blatant, in corporate history." See Melissa Davis, 
HealthSouth Spotlight Turns to Ex-Auditor, THE~TREET.COM, May 22, 2003, 
http://www.thestreet.com/_tscs/stocks/melissada~d/lOO89204.h~. 
43. At Enron, for example, the misrepresentations and the improper accounting 
practices that led to  Enron's bankruptcy were long-standing and well-known throughout the 
corporate executives at Enron made outlandish profit predictions, 
employees knew they must "gin . . . up" earnings and revenues to 
match the predictions.44 Thus, executives may have hatched 
accounting scams, but often their underlings were sent to do the 
dirty work of executing the plan despite the underlings' knowledge 
that such accounting was illegal.45 
Furthermore, even if employees did not directly participate in the 
fraud, employees often knew that something in the corporation was 
amiss. At Enron, for example, knowledge about earnings 
manipulation was so widespread that employees joked about it at 
company parties.46 For months prior to Enron's bankruptcy filing, 
numerous employees knew that executives' public statements about 
Enron's financial strength were not true and that the company's 
business was failing.47 But despite their lengthy exposure to flawed 
financial practices and public misrepresentations, few employees 
came forward to ~ornplain.~' Importantly, this failure to report is not 
unique to Enron. In fact, studies reveal that the majority of 
corporate employees who witnessed wrongdoing did not report it.49 
Successhl whistleblowers, by definition, overcame this inherent 
hesitation to speak out. 
company. See, ea., MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 116; id. at 182-83 (giving examples 
of employee knowledge of Enron's practice of inflating sales numbers); id. at 219-20, 230, 
269-70 (discussing wide-spread employee knowledge and participation in various strategies to  
manipulate California's energy market); see also id. at 303-04, 332. 
44. See id. at 289. 
45. See Davis, supra note 42 (noting that the CEO of HealthSouth admitted to  
directing the company's auditing staff to  inflate the company's earnings); Kenneth N. Gilpin, 
&-Rite Aid Oflcials Face U.S. Charges of Financial Frattd, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,2002, at A1 
(noting that the indictment of  the CFO for Rite Aid alleged that he coordinated the 
accounting fraud by "instructing less-senior employees in the accounting department to  make 
unsupported entries in the company's books and records that did not meet generally accepted 
accounting principles"). 
46. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 296. 
47. See, ea.,  ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 
2 4 6 4 7  (2003); MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 230,303,332. 
48. There are exceptions, of course. In March 2001, one Enron employee sent an 
anonymous letter to  Fortune magazine to complain that company executives were understating 
the extent of recent job cuts. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 332. 
49. Several studies have found low reporting rates among employees who witness 
misconduct. See, ea., MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 96-99; TERANCE D. MIETHE, 
WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK: TOUGH CHOICES IN EXPOSING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE ON 
THE JOB 31 (1999); Estlund, supra note 9,  at 119-20; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 
332-33 (surveying six studies of whistleblowing and finding that the average rate of 
whistleblowing is forty-two percent). 
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b. Executive blocking and filtering. A second flow-of-information 
failure occurred because of executive blocking and filtering of 
whistleblower reports, so that even if employees spoke out, their 
disclosures of wrongdoing were ineffective. Many whistleblowers 
reported information to corporate executives rather than to 
traditional corporate monitors, such as the board of directors. 
Executives subsequently prevented such information from reaching 
corporate monitors in order to protect the company from penalties 
and scandal.50 Such problems were apparent in many recent cases of 
corporate fraud;51 however, the fraud at Enron presents the clearest 
and most well documented example.52 
At the core of the Enron scandal were "massive accounting fraud 
and irregularities, a principal feature of which was the use of 
structured finance techniques designed to get debt off Enron's 
balance sheet and inflate Enron's profits."53 During the course of this 
fraud, Enron executives successfully blocked many employee 
complaints regarding improper or illegal business tactics by 
responding to any complaint with hostility and ob fu~ca t i on .~~  From 
50. See Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1313-14. 
51. For example, in August 2001, a Global Crossing vice president for finance wrote the 
company's Chief Ethics Officer claiming that the company was engaging in improper 
accounting techniques. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED 362-63 (2003). The top 
executives at the company never sent this letter to its Board or its auditors. See id. at 363. 
52. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1518 n.4 (2004) (listing the "staggering amount of scholarship on 
Enron"); Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll &Mr. Skilling: How Enron's 
Public Image Morphcd from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most 
Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON: CORPORATE FLASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra 
note 18, at 77, 8 7  (noting that since Enron's bankruptcy filing, Enron books "have become 
their own cottage industry"); id. at 8 7  11.36 (listing dozens of books published about Enron). 
See ~enerally POWERS ET AL., supra note 2 (including an investigative report by special 
committee of the Enron Board of Directors). 
53. Paredes, supra note 18, at 503. 
54. See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 135, 149-50,294; MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, 
at 308-09; Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, in ENKON: 
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 18, at 927, 937  ("Those who 
objected often found themselves the subject of pressure, downright abuse, and exile."); Tim 
Mcguire, More Than Work: Many Yelled 'Fire!' at Enron, But Deceit Drowned Them Out, 
WINSTON-SALEM J . ,  Aug. 21, 2005 ("That was a clear pattern at Enron: If anyone suggested 
wrongdoing, they were considered a hindrance and ousted."). Several researchers have 
described anecdotal evidence of management hostility to underlings who report wrongdoing as 
typical of reactions to  whistleblowers. See, ea., Alan F. Westin, Conclusion t o  WHISTLE- 
the company's earliest days, Enron executives silenced and 
undermined employees who raised concerns about Enron's 
accounting and financial practices.55 This information blocking grew 
increasingly problematic by the late 1990s, when employees 
repeatedly complained to Enron's risk assessment group and 
corporate executives about the off-balance sheet "special purpose 
entities" that became the center of the Enron scandal.56 These 
complaints never made it to the Board of Directors, which, on three 
separate occasions, waived Enron's Code of Ethics and approved the 
conflicts of interests these entities created.57 Enron's Board never 
substantively investigated the propriety or long-term impact of these 
en ti tie^.^' Furthermore, in early 2001, as Enron's businesses began 
to show signs of strain, a few employees reported to corporate 
executives that large losses were being hidden.59 Executives 
disregarded these reports and never completed internal 
in~esti~ations.~' At least one employee wrote a signed letter to 
Enron's management and the Secretary of the Board in which she 
detailed the misrepresentations about Enron's earnings.61 The letter, 
however, was never shown to Enron's Board of Dire~t0i-s .~~ 
BLOWING! LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 131, 132 (Alan Westin ed., 1981); 
see nlso Westin, s:qrn note 31, at 10-12. 
55. See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 38-42 (describing actions by Ken Lay in the late 1980s 
to  cover up internal reports regarding falsified bank statements and illegal payments to 
corporate officers); M C L W  & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 94-95 (describing 1994 complaints 
by Jim Alexander regarding internal accounting issues). 
56. See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 160, 226, 231; MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 
192-93, 308-09; POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 6 6 6 7  (describing complaints by Jeff 
McMahon t o  Jeffrey Skilling, Enron's President and COO, regarding the failure of controls to 
protect Enron from Andrew Fastow's conflict of interest in creating the special purpose 
entities). 
57. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 148-65; Paredes, supra note 18, at 503. As 
Professor Paredes noted, by utilizing these special purpose entities that he individually 
controlled, Enron's CFO, Andrew Fastow, "stood to  make millions by, essentially, negotiating 
against Enron." Id. at 503. The Board hardly discussed this massive conflict of interest or how 
to monitor it. See M C L W  & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 193. There is no indication that 
internal employee concerns with the arrangements ever reached the Board. See id. 
58. See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 16445,228-29. 
59. M C L W  & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 299-304 (describing internal investigation of 
Enron Energy Services by Wanda Curry, an Enron accountant, which uncovered hundreds of 
millions of dollars worth of "unacknowledged, speculative trading losses"). 
60. Id. 
61. See id. at 358-59. 
62. See id. at 359. 
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Even when employees avoided management's information 
blocking, corporate executives often filtered or slanted employee 
reports before the information reached the monitors. For example, 
Sherron Watkins, the famed Enron ~histleblower,6~ was unsuccesshl 
in stopping Enron's fraud because the information she disclosed 
about misconduct at Enron was sanitized before it reached the Board 
of Directors. Watkins's error was that she complained to Enron's 
CEO, Kenneth Lay, rather than to the h l l  Board of Directors.@ Lay 
subsequently hired the law firm of Vinson & Elkins to investigate the 
allegations-the very same law firm that approved many of the 
transactions about which Watkins ~ompla ined .~~  When the Board 
ultimately learned of Watkins's allegations, the report was 
whitewashed by Vinson & Elkins's conclusion that the transactions 
Watkins reported were proper.66 Thus, by hand-picking his friends at 
Vinson & Elkins to investigate Watkins's claims, Lay successfully 
filtered Watkins's h l l  allegations from reaching the Board and the 
Although Watkins certainly deserves credit for her 
63. See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 36, at 32-33 (naming Watkins a "Person of the 
Yearn). 
64. In August 2001, Watkins reported her concerns regarding the accounting problems 
t o  Lay, first in an anonymous letter, and subsequently in a meeting with Lay. See Cherry, supra 
note 8, at 1036-37 & 11.31; Leslie Griffin, Whistleblowing in the Business World, in ENRON: 
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 18, at 209, 210-11. Watkins 
presciently warned of her concern that Enron might "implode in a wave of accounting 
scandals." Memorandum from Sherron Watkins t o  Kenneth Lay (Aug. 15, 2001), available a t  
http://energycommerce.house.gov/l07/he~O2142002Hearing489/tab1O.pdf. For a 
more lengthy description of Watkins's role, see BRYCE, supra note 47, at 293-99, and 
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 354-58. 
65. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 173; Griffin, supra note 64, at 213-14. Lay 
justified this choice by concluding that the investigation would only be "preliminary" and 
could be conducted most quickly by V h o n  & Elkins because the law firm was "familiar" with 
Enron. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 173. However, as noted by Enron's own Board- 
led investigation after the bankruptcy filing, "[tlhe result of the V&E review was largely 
predetermined by the scope and nature of the investigation and the process employed." Id. at 
176. 
66. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 366; POWERS ET AL., srbpra note 2, at 
173-77. At the Board meeting, a Vinson & Elkins attorney "assured the audit committee that 
[the Watkins letter] wasn't a problem; his preliminary investigation had already concluded 
there was no need to look any further. No Enron director asked to  see Watkins's letter . . . and 
there was no specific discussion of her concerns about the [special purpose entities]." MCLEAV 
& ELKIND, supra note 3, at 366. 
67. Eventually, Watkins unveiled much of Enron's "fuzzy" accounting to  the 
government during her testimony to  Congress in February 2002. See The Financial Collapse of 
Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. 
on Energy @ Commerce, 107th Cdng. 14-66 (2002) (testimony of Sherron Watkins). 
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willingness to step forward and report her concerns to Enron's CEO, 
she ultimately was not eflectzve as a whistleblower because she 
provided information to Enron's executives rather than directly to 
Enron's B ~ a r d . ~ '  
Finally, any conceivably problematic information that did make it 
to Enron's traditional monitors often was discounted or ignored 
based upon the close relationship between the monitors and Enron 
executives. Enron's Board, although ideally independent on paper,69 
never effectively questioned Enron's management regarding its 
financial practices." Moreover, "gatekeepers," such as Enron's 
outside accountants and attorneys who received huge fees from 
Enron, did not raise red flags to anyone on Enron's Board even 
though they knew Enron's aggressive accounting techniques were 
problematic.71 The close relationships between purportedly 
independent monitors and Enron executives led to "group think" 
that prevented such monitors from dispassionately fulfilling their 
responsibilities and questioning information provided by corporate 
 executive^.'^ Unfiltered information from employees, however, 
However, these public disclosures occurred only after Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 
2001 and Congress discovered her initial memo to  Lay. See POWERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 
32. 
68. Despite the public accolades she received, Watkins's ineffectiveness as a 
whistleblower has been criticized. In his well-regarded book regarding the collapse of Enron, 
Robert Bryce entitled his chapter on Watkins "Sherron Watkins Saves Her Own Ass." See 
BRYCE, supra note 47, at 293; Griffin, supra note 64, at 220-21; see also Dan Ackman, 
Whistleblower?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,2002, at A10. 
69. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the 
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69  U .  CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2002); 
Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 542. 
70. See Kostant, supra note 69, at 542. 
71. See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 298; POWERS ETAL., supra note 2, at 17, 24-26; see 
also Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 17, at 301 ("All too often, lawyers acted as facilitators 
and enablers of management impropriety."); Coffee, supra note 19, at 313-15 (discussing 
accountants' role); Gordon, supra note 69, at 1237 (discussing accountants' role); Gordon, 
supra note 26, at 1138 (noting that lawyers had "the capacity to create endless shells under 
which to  hide and move the peas"); Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2227 (2004) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("Lawyers' 
negligence almost certainly contributed to  the wave of  corporate scandals that shook the 
securities markets in 2001 and 2002."). 
72. See Fanto, supra note 24, at 441-42, 446-49; O'Connor, supra note 23, at 1257- 
93. "Group think" involves a "culture of silence" in which corporate leaders discourage critical 
discussions and influence from individuals outside of the corporate "inner circle." Fanto, suprn 
note 24, at 469; see also O'Connor, supra note 23, at 1242-55 (asserting that whatever 
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might have forced these monitors to fulfill their oversight 
responsibilities despite their close relationship with Enron 
management. 
Most commentators ignored the role of corporate employees in 
these scandals and, instead, blamed the failures of the traditional 
corporate monitors for the success of the  deception^.'^ In part, this 
blame is well deserved: the duties of traditional corporate monitors 
to investigate potential misconduct are more pronounced and 
formalized-and their authority to intervene is more apparent-than 
the duties and authority of rank-and-file employees. Yet thousands of 
employees participated in, knew of, or willfully ignored the massive 
misconduct occurring within their c~mpanies. '~ Such information 
would have been useful to corporate monitors, perhaps leading to 
earlier discovery of the fraud. 
The corporate employee's potential as an effective corporate 
monitor cannot be ignored. A response to the recent corporate 
scandals should be to encourage more employee whistleblowing and 
to encourage effective whistleblowing by assisting employees in 
avoiding the problems of blocking and filtering by corporate 
executives. The remainder of this Article examines whether the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes the best means of implementing these 
goals. 
111. Two WHISTLEBLOWER MODELS 
Both the Anti-retaliation Model and the Structural Model 
existed before recent corporate scandals, yet neither model effectively 
encouraged employees to disclose information about corporate 
information is received by directors often is analyzed in the context of norms of building board 
cohesiveness that make it difficult to test and question what is being told to them). 
73. See, ea., Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 17, at 301 (blaming attorneys); Coffee, 
supra note 19, at 313-15 (blaming outside auditors); Fanto, supra note 24, at 435-37 
(blaming corporate directors). 
74. See, ea., Neal E .  Boudette & Joann S. Lublin, Delphi Discloses New Irregularities in 
Its Accounting, WALL ST.  J., June 10, 2005, at A3 (noting that although Delphi Corporation's 
"treasury staffwas aware of the [undisclosed] off-balance sheet debt," no one reported it to the 
company's CEO, the "board of directors, or credit-rating agenciesn). After the scandals, 
recovering corporations realized the danger of having employees who remain silent in the face 
of financial misconduct. New management at both WorldCom (now known as MCI) and Tyco 
fired employees and executives who likely knew about financial improprieties. See Joseph 
McCafferty, Adelphia Comes Clean, CFO MAG.,  Dec. 1, 2003, available at 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/301105l/l/c~3036074?f=insidecfo. 
fraud. As part of its response to the scandals, Congress implemented 
versions of both models in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
A. InsufJiciency of the Anti-retaliation Model 
Academics widely praised the anti-retaliation provision of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley calling it the "gold standard" of whistleblower 
protection77 and "the most important whistleblower protection law 
in the For the first time, millions of employees would be 
protected by a national statute against r e ta l i a t i~n .~~  
The Act provides a broad definition of retaliation. Employers 
may not "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any 
other manner discriminate" against whistlebl~wers.~~ The Act also 
provides extensive remedies for employees injured by retaliation for 
whistleblowing. Discharged employees may be reinstated and may 
receive compensatory special damages, including litigation costs and 
attorneys' fees.81 Furthermore, individuals may be criminally 
75. The other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley alter corporate governance on many fronts. 
Among other things, the Act established a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to 
govern accounting firms, established rules regarding auditor and director independence, 
enhanced the requirements for financial disclosures, increased criminal penalties for certain 
white-collar crimes, and altered responsibilities for various corporate players, such as audit 
committees, corporate attorneys, corporate officers, and securities analysts. See generally 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 & 18  U.S.C.). 
76. The anti-retaliation provision is part of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability Act of 2002, which is Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See id. § 806 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2000)). Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provisions have 
been thoroughly described and analyzed in other places. Seegenerally KOHN ET AL., supra note 
8 (analyzing legal requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision); Vaughn, supra 
note 8 (also analyzing legal requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision). 
Accordingly, I will only briefly outline its provisions here. 
77. See, ea., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self- 
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005). 
78. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 105; see also KOHN ET AL., supra note 8, at xii (stating that 
the whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are "the most systematic whistleblower 
protection framework enacted into federal lawn). But see Cherry, supra note 8, at 1034 
(concluding that Sarbanes-Oxley is a "half-measure and not the true reform that securities law 
needs to  respond to corporate kaud"). 
79. See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3. 
80. See 18  U.S.C. $ 1514A(a). 
81. See id. § 1514A(c); see also KOHN ET AL., supra note 8, at 11 1 (noting that 
Sarbanes-Oxley is one of only four federal statutes that permit recovery of attorneys' fees as 
part of "special damages" that must be awarded); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 9 7  n.400 (noting 
benefits of reinstatement as a remedy). 
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prosecuted for retaliating against whistleblowers, which seemingly 
would further deter potential r e ta l i a t i~n .~~  
Unlike many federal anti-retaliation statutes, an employee 
victimized by retaliation may bring a private cause of action under 
Sarbanes-Oxley in federal district court. Although an employee's 
claim must first be brought to the Department of Labor- 
specifically, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA)-a court claim may be brought if the administrative process 
is not completed within 180 days,g3 which rarely happens.84 
Yet Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision suffers from 
significant limitations. The Act only protects employees of public 
corporations and only if such employees report violations of federal 
securities laws.85 Its statute of limitations period of ninety days is 
unreasonably short because it does not give employees enough time 
to deal with the after-effects of retaliation, consider their options, 
hire an attorney, and have the attorney investigate the merits of the 
case before filing a ~ o m p l a i n t . ~ ~  The remedies do not include any 
sort of punitive or liquidated damages to provide extra 
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (providing for fines and/or imprisonment of up to  ten 
years for retaliating against a person for providing a law enforcement officer with truthhl 
information relating to commission of a federal crime). 
83. See id. § 1514A(b). Sarbanes-Oxley assigned responsibility for whistleblower 
investigations to  the Department of Labor. The Department of Labor subsequently assigned 
the responsibility to  OSHA, which also conducts whistleblower investigations under thirteen 
other federal statutes. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIVE 
ASSISTANCE, THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/ 
index.htm1 (last visited Oct. 25,2006) (listing other statutes). 
84. See Final Decision and Order Dismissing Appeal at 3 n.5, Allen v. Stewart Enter., 
No. 05-059 (ARB Case Aug. 17, 2005) (noting that complainants dismissed their appeal in 
order to file in federal district court and stating that "[als is the usual case, the 180-day period 
for deciding the case had expired before the Complainants filed their petition with the 
Board"); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 88. The complete administrative process includes an initial 
OSHA investigation, review by an Administrative Law Judge, and final review by the 
Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.104, .107, ,110 
(2005). Given the current caseload for OSHA, the initial investigation alone can take almost 
180 days. The average time between the filing of a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint with OSHA and 
the issuance of a report by the OSHA investigator was 127 days for Fiscal Year 2005. See E- 
mail from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to Richard Moberly, 
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file 
with author). This time period has grown significantly longer since the enactment of Sarbanes- 
Oxley; in Fiscal Year 2003, the average length of a Sarbanes-Oxley investigation was ninety- 
two days. See id. 
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). 
86. See id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D). 
encouragement for whistle blower^.^^ Finally, requiring employees to 
jump through OSHA's administrative hoops before bringing a claim 
in federal district court88 can be "cumbersome rather than 
expeditious, biased rather than expert, [and] ineffective rather than 
efficient. "89 
These statutory restrictions likely contribute to the low success 
rates of employees who bring claims under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
According to OSHA, of the 784 cases resolved at the initial 
investigative level prior to September 30, 2006, OSHA investigators 
found only 17 to have merit, while another 106 cases settled.90 The 
percentage of meritorious and settled cases for Sarbanes-Oxley is 
slightly lower than the percentage of successful claimants for other 
whistleblower statutes administered by perhaps suggesting 
that the "stronger" whistleblower protections of Sarbanes-Oxley do 
not result in more protections for whistle blower^.^^ Moreover, of the 
119 OSHA-level decisions that were appealed by April 28,2005, the 
Department of Labor's Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) decided in 
favor of employees only 4 times, while another 19 settled.93 
The decisions issued by the ALJs further exacerbate Sarbanes- 
Oxley's statutory shortcomings. Procedural issues eviscerate 
claimants' cases. Several decisions dismissed complaints because the 
wrong corporate entity was named94 or because a corporation filed a 
registration statement with the SEC but withdrew it before it 
87. See id. § 1514A(c). 
88. See id. $ 1514A(b); 29 C.F.R §§ 1980.101, ,103, ,104 (2005). 
89. Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower 
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581,621 (1999). 
90. See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, t o  Richard 
Moberly, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law (Oct. 3, 2006) 
(on file with author). 
91. See id. Interestingly, OSHA considers cases that have settled to  be meritorious, and 
thus includes settled cases in its "success" rate. See id. 
92. Another contributing factor may be that employees are testing the outer boundaries 
of this new statute in the early years after its enactment. I t  may be that the success rate 
increases after ALJs, the ARB, and the courts answer basic questions regarding jurisdiction and 
applicability. 
93. See Email from Todd Smyth, Office of Administrative Law Judges, to  Richard 
Moberly, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law (July 8,2005) (on 
file with author). 
94. See, ea., Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-11 
(Dep't of Labor July 6, 2004) (dismissing complaint for failure to name both the publicly held 
parent company and its subsidiary). 
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became effective, thus denying coverage under the Act.95 Claims 
have also been dismissed for missing the ninety-day statute of 
limitations window? including claims that missed the deadline by 
less than two weeks.97 ALJs routinely reject equitable tolling of the 
statute of  limitation^.^^ ALJs dismissed other claims because 
employees made whistleblower disclosures about topics not strictly 
addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley, such as underpayment of employees,99 
racial discrimination,loO or environmental vi~lations,'~' rather than 
securities fraud. 
These problems with Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision 
reflect larger problems with the Anti-retaliation Model. First, anti- 
retaliation provisions in general do  not provide realistic 
encouragement for employees to become corporate monitors 
because they focus on protection only after a disclosure is made.lo2 
Surveys demonstrate that most employees are unaware of the 
protections they may (or may not) receive should they report 
wrongdoing.103 Moreover, even if an employee is aware that a 
disclosure might be protected, it is exceedingly difficult to determine 
the extent of any protection because there is little consistency among 
whistleblower statutes.'" Whether a whistleblower is protected 
95. See Roulett v. Am. Capital Access, No. 2004-SOX-00078 (Dep't of Labor Dec. 22, 
2004). 
96. See, eg. ,  Lawrence v. AT&T Labs, No. 2004-SOX-00065 (Dep't of Labor Sept. 9, 
2004); Kingoff v. Maxim Group L.L.C., No. 2004-SOX-00057 (Dep't of Labor July 21, 
2004). 
97. See Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-00054 (Dep't of Labor 
Aug. 31, 2005); Hopkins v. ATK Tactical Sys., No. 2004-SOX-00019 (Dep't of Labor May 
27,2004). 
98. See Halpern, ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-54, at 4; Harvey v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 
2004-SOX-20, at 2 (Dep't of Labor June 2, 2006); Flood v. Cendent Corp., ALJ Case No. 
2004-SOX-16. 
99. See Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-35 (Dep't of Labor June 10,2004). 
100. See Harvey, No. 2004-SOX-20. 
101. See Hopkins, No. 2004-SOX-19. 
102. See, eg. ,  C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 108-13 (2001); MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at  66, 153-56; 
MIETHE, supra note 49, at  133; Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Aumalian, 
U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 879, 908-09 
(2004); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MMNC's, and Peace, 35 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 457,474 (2002). 
103. See MIETHE, supra note 49, at 54. 
104. See 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
("[Clorporate employees who report fraud are subject to the patchwork and vagaries of 
current state laws."). 
depends upon the employee's state of residence, the industry in 
which the employee works, the type of misconduct reported,'05 the 
type of retaliation endured,lo6 and, under some statutes, the 
willingness of administrative agencies to enforce the law.'07 Sarbanes- 
Oxley only adds to this confusion because of its applicability to 
specific types of employees making specific kinds of disclosures. 
The second failure of the Anti-retaliation Model is that it does 
not address the flow-of-information problems revealed by recent 
scandals. Even if whistleblowing occurs and is protected, the Model 
does not produce effective whistleblowing because anti-retaliation 
laws rarely indicate to whom an employee should make a disclosure. 
Therefore, although an employee may be protected from retaliation 
if she reports corporate misconduct to a supervisor or corporate 
executive, such information may never reach traditional corporate 
monitors because of executive blocking and filtering. As discussed 
above, in order for whistleblowers to act effectively as part of the 
corporate monitoring system, employees must be able to report 
misconduct to those with the authority and responsibility to end it 
rather than to a supervisor who has less incentive to relay potentially 
damaging information. The Anti-retaliation Model simply does not 
address this issue. 
Despite their shortcomings, anti-retaliation provisions provide 
important protections to whistleblowers by ensuring that they are 
not punished for engaging in socially beneficial conduct. Some 
surveys report that well over half of whistleblowers experience some 
sort of retaliation.lo8 Other researchers place the actual number much 
105. States vary widely in the type of protections they provide. Some, like Georgia, rigidly 
adhere to  the at-will employment doctrine. See Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 
(Ga. Ct.  App. 1978) (finding that Georgia's employment-at-will statute permitted employer to 
fire employee because employee was about to uncover criminal activities). Others, like New 
Jersey, have a broad reaching statute protecting any whistleblower who reports any violation of 
law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19 (West 2005). Federal law protects only whistleblowers who 
report certain types of violations in certain industries, and the extent of the protection varies 
depending on the statute. See, e a . ,  STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS m~ PROCEDURES IN 
WHISTLEBLOWERLAW 79-80 (2001); MICELI &NEAR, supra note 6, at 233-34. 
106. Some laws protect employees only if they are discharged and d o  not address other 
forms of retaliation. See, ea . ,  White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) (limiting 
retaliation suits to  cases in which an employee was actually or constructively discharged). 
107. See Estlund, supra note 9,  at 122 n.92 (noting statistics indicating OSHA was not 
sufficiently enforcing the whistleblower provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act). 
108. See, e.B., ALFORD, supra note 102, at 18 (citing studies in which one-half to  two- 
thirds of whistleblowers lose their jobs); Gerald V i t en ,  Whistleblowing--Fact or Fiction: A n  
11071 Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model 
lower;109 nonetheless, the results of retaliation can be devastating. 
Whistleblowing employees have been found dead or beaten."' Some 
whistleblowers lose their jobs and suffer emotional and financial 
difficulties; studies show several losing their homes, filing for 
bankruptcy, becoming divorced, and even attempting suicide."' In 
short, the Anti-retaliation Model is necessary but insufficient to 
address the flow-of-information problems uncovered in recent 
scandals. 
B. Inefiectiveness of Pre-scandal Versions of the Structural Model 
In contrast to the Anti-retaliation Model, the Structural Model 
focuses on encouraging and supporting whistleblowing before any 
disclosure is made. The Structural Model is based on the 
understanding that whistleblowing becomes easier and more 
acceptable when corporations provide an authorized and visible 
Introductory Discussion, in WHISTLEBLOWING-SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP?, 
supra note 7, at 3, 10-11 (citing study concluding that eighty-six of eighty-seven 
whistleblowers experienced retaliation); Brickey, supra note 33, at 365 & n.35 (citing a non- 
scientific survey of two hundred whistleblowers by National Whistleblower Center finding that 
over one-half had lost their jobs, and citing a survey by Government Accountability Project 
that ninety percent of whistleblowers experienced retaliation or threats). 
109. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6,  at 203 (suggesting that generalizing about rate 
of retaliation is difficult because of variables in studies and citing a study in which less than 
twenty percent of whistleblowers were retaliated against); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet 
Near, A Better Statutory Approach t o  Whistleblowing, 7 BUS. ETHICS Q. 1, 6 (1997) (arguing 
that studies show that most whistleblowers d o  not suffer retaliation, even though most people 
think they do). 
110. Although it has been difficult to  connect such events to  the employee's 
whistleblowing activities, examples of atrocities inflicted upon whistleblowers abound, 
including the death of Karen Silkwood. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 
(1984). More recently, an employee of Los Alamos National Laboratory was beaten shortly 
before he was t o  testify before Congress regarding alleged fraud at the lab. See Bradley Graham 
& Griff W~tte,  Whistle-Blower at  LQS Alamos Attacked in Parking Lot in N.M., WASH. POST, 
June 7, 2005, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2005/06/06/AR2005060601787~pf.html. One of the primary whistleblowers in the 
mutual hnds  scandal was also beaten. See O'Donnell, supra note 41. 
11 1. See, ea.,  ALFORD, supra note 102, at 19-20; Vinten, supra note 108, at 11. Outside 
of these extremes, retaliation may take many forms, including "harassment, threats of 
termination, suspension, non-promotion, reassignment, transfer, denial of training, 
withholding wages or other benefits, closer supervision and scrutiny, o r  pestering." Ben 
Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing 26 (George Mason Law & Econ. Res., Paper No. 
04-56, 2004), available at  http://ssrn.com/absuact=622723; see aLro ALFORD, supra note 
102, at 31; Baynes, supra note 8, at 895. Even former employees may face blacklisting from 
certain industries o r  from the job market in general. See, ea., Brickey, supra note 33, at 364- 
65; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 326; Depoorter & De Mot, supra, at 26 & n.106. 
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channel for employees to report misconduct.112 Unlike the Anti- 
retaliation Model, which, to be utilized at all, assumes an adversarial 
relationship between the employee whistleblower and the employer, 
the Structural Model encourages employees to become part of the 
corporate monitoring system, allowing them to work in concert with 
the corporation rather than against it. The Structural Model 
encourages employees to report misconduct by highlighting the 
extrinsic social and employment benefits of monitoring ethical and 
regulatory standards while cooperating with the c~rporation."~ 
Instead of impractically relying on management hierarchies to relay 
reports of misconduct to external regulators, the Structural Model 
provides a visible mechanism for employee reports to reach the ears 
of those who can remedy the misconduct. 
Despite its potential benefits, versions of the Structural Model in 
place in both the public and private sectors prior to recent corporate 
scandals were ineffective. In the public sphere, the federal 
government created a structure for whistleblowing employees to 
report misconduct in both the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IGA) 
and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CsRA).ll4 Under these 
statutes, Congress created offices specifically charged with receiving 
and investigating federal employee claims of wrongdoing in the 
g~vernment."~ The IGA required most federal agencies to create a 
position of Inspector General, which received complaints from that 
agency's  employee^."^ The CSRA was broader in its approach and 
provided an outlet for reports from any federal employee through 
the Ofice of Special Counsel (OSC).'17 
112. Social science research demonstrates that whistleblowing increases when there is an 
identifiable, specific means for whistleblowing to occur. See, ea., Janet P .  Near & Terry M. 
Dworkin, Responses to Lgisfative Changes: Corporate Whistleblowing Policies, 1 7  J .  Bus. ETHICS 
1551,1557 (1998). 
1 13. See discussion infra Part N. 
114. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. $$ 1-12 (2000); Civil Service 
Reform Act of  1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of title 5 of the United States Code). Both statutes also incorporated the Anti- 
retaliation Model by protecting federal employees who report any violations of law, rule, or 
regulation, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specific danger to  public health or safety. See, ea., 5 U.S.C. app. $7 ;  id. $ 2302(b)(8). 
115. See id. app. $ 2; id. $ 1206(b), repealed by Pub. L. 101-12 $ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16 
(1989). 
116. See id. app. $ 2 
117. See id. $1206(b)(3), repealed by Pub. L. 101-12, $ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16 (1989). 
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The beginnings of the Structural Model are best seen in the 
OSC. The OSC receives whistleblower disclosures and informs the 
necessary federal agency about potential misconduct occurring 
within its ranks.l18 By informing agencies of potential problems, 
Congress hoped that the OSC would become an "'early warning 
system' of budding problems, serious enough to place agency 
leadership on notice and to require ackn~wledgement.""~ If the 
OSC believes that a whistleblower's disclosure reveals a "substantial 
likelihood" of wrongdoing within a government agency, the OSC 
can require that agency to conduct an investigation and submit a 
report covering its findings.120 The OSC evaluates the report and 
determines whether the agency's findings are reasonable and contain 
the appropriate information required by statute.121 Ultimately, the 
OSC submits the agency reports to Congress and the President and 
keeps a public file of the report.122 Thus, the CSRA (and the IGA 
under similar provisions) go hrther than simply protecting 
whistleblowing employees from retaliation, although they 
theoretically do that as well. Congress intended for these statutes to 
encourage whistleblowing by providing public-sector employees with 
an easy channel to report rnisc~nduct . '~~ 
Prior to recent corporate scandals, whistleblower disclosure 
channels were not imposed upon corporations in the private sector. 
Rather, Congress and various courts gave organizations incentives to 
create internal compliance systems, which often would include 
118. See id. $ 1206(b)(2); see also Thomas M .  Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Abuse of 
Authorityr The W c e  of the Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection, 4 ANTIOCH L.J.  5, 52 
(1986). 
119. Devine & Aplin, supra note 118, at 19-20 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. H11822 
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Rep. Schroeder)). 
120. See 5 U.S.C. $ 1206(b)(3)(A), repealed by Pub. L. 101-12, $3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16 
(1989). 
121. See id. In cases in which the OSC believed that the employee's information about 
misconduct was reasonably supported, the agency's report had to  include a variety of 
information, including a summary of the investigation, a listing of any violation of law, ~ l e ,  or 
regulation, and a description of any corrective action taken as a result of the investigation. See 
id. $ 1206(b). 
122. Id. $ 1206(b)(5)(A). If the agency failed to submit a timely report, the OSC was to  
notify Congress and the President of that failure as well. See id. 
123. See Devine & Aplin, supra note 118, at 20  ("The purpose of the OSC 
whistleblowing disclosure channel was 'to encourage employees to give the government the 
first crack at cleaning its own house before igniting the glare of publicity to force correction.'" 
(footnote omitted)). 
implementing disclosure channels for employees to report corporate 
misconduct. 
In 1991, Congress approved the federal Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines (OSG), which utilized a "carrot and stick" 
approach12* to encourage organizations to implement an "effective 
program to prevent and detect violations of law."125 Under the OSG, 
penalties for corporations convicted of crimes could be reduced by 
up to ninety-five percent if the corporation previously implemented 
such a program. Conversely, if no such program existed, then the 
potential fines could be multiplied by up to four hundred percent.'26 
An "effective program" required that the organization exercise due 
diligence in preventing and detecting criminal conduct within the 
organization.'27 Such due diligence, in turn, required "having in 
place and publicizing a reporting system whereby employees and 
other agents could report criminal conduct by others within the 
organization without fear of retr ib~tion." '~~ 
The judiciary also gave incentives to corporations to monitor 
themselves more closely through structural disclosure ~hanne1s. l~~ In 
an influential opinion, Delaware's Chancery Court opined that a 
director of a corporation has a duty to be reasonably informed about 
the corporation, a duty which includes implementing an adequate 
"corporate information and reporting system."'30 This holding 
124. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and 
Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and 
Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 190-91 (2002); Dworkin, supra note 102, at 
464; Near & Dworkin, supra note 112, at 1557; Win Swenson, The Organizational 
Grridelines' "Carrot and Stick" Philosophy, and Their Focus on cEfective" Compliance, in GOOD 
CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 27,29. 
125. U.S. SE~TENCING UIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k) (1991) 
[hereinafter OSG]. The OSG were amended after the corporate scandals in November 2004. 
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES AND 
COMPLIANCE, http://www.ussc.gov/orgguide.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) (providing 
manual of federal sentencing guidelines and policy statements effective Nov. 1,2004). 
126. See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New 
Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565,567 (2004). 
127. OSG, supra note 125, § 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k). 
128. Id. $ 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k)(5). 
129. See Callahan et al., supra note 124, at  190; Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 480-84 
(2001). 
130. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). Failure to set up such a 
corporate reporting structure may expose the director to breach of fiduciary charges if the lack 
of such a system caused a loss. Id. 
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encourages directors to initiate and maintain a disclosure channel for 
employees and encourages agents to inform directors about 
problems within the corporation because a breach of this duty could 
result in director liability.131 In the sexual harassment context, the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that employers who make reasonable 
efforts to deter and correct illegally harassing behavior may have an 
affirmative defense available to them against a sexual harassment 
plaintiff who has not been subject to a tangible employment 
action.'32 The Court has further held that if a corporation has an 
internal mechanism available to report wrongdoing, then it may be 
able to avoid punitive damages in a later wronml  discharge case 
brought by a whi~tleblower.'~~ These judicial holdings encourage 
corporations to establish whistleblower disclosure channels because 
they mitigate corporate liability for misconduct, along with its 
attendant litigation costs, if sufficient processes are in ~ 1 a c e . l ~ ~  
Yet, these pre-scandal versions of the Structural Model, like the 
Anti-retaliation Model, failed to encourage effective whistleblowing. 
One problem was that whistleblower disclosure systems often did 
not provide a legitimate outlet for employees to report misconduct 
because the channels resulted in disclosure to a non-responsive or 
biased party. For example, the OSG do not speci@ to whom 
whistleblower disclosures must be r e ~ 0 r t e d . l ~ ~  Thus, in order to 
satisfy the OSG, corporations implemented disclosure channels that 
flowed up through the corporate management hierarchy,136 placing 
employee disclosures at risk of management blocking and filtering. 
The CSRA exemplifies the related problem of reporting to a 
biased party. The CSRA's whistleblowing channel did not work, in 
large part because of the anti-employee bias of a series of Special 
Counsels that summarily failed to order investigations of employee 
131. See Dworkin, supra note 102, at 466. 
132. See Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807 (1998). 
133. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 5 4 5 4 6  (1999); see also Callahan et 
al., supra note 124, at 194. 
134. See Callahan et al., supra note 124, at 192-93; Sturm, supra note 129, at 557. 
135. See OSG, supra note 125, s8A1.2, Application Note 3(k)(5). 
136. See Andrew R Apel, A National Study of Compliance Practices, in GOOD CITIZEN, 
supra note 3, at 127, 127-30; Edward S. Peuy, A Study of Compliance Practices in 
aCompliance Aware" Companies, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 139,13942.  
corn plaint^.'^^ Although the first two Special Counsels ordered 
agency investigations for approximately 25 percent of employee 
complaints, beginning in 1983, a new Special Counsel drastically 
reduced the number of investigations ordered to approximately 7.5 
percent of the complaints.138 In other words, whistleblower 
disclosures were being made, but the OSC rarely required agencies 
to confront the problems being raised. Ultimately, the CSRA was 
amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, but the 
unchallenged discretion of the Special Counsel to order 
investigations remains,139 leaving in doubt the ability of government 
employees to report wrongdoing effectively.14' 
137. Devine & Aplin, supra note 118, at 52. The discretion was magnified because "no 
standards of accountability were established for the OSC, the opportunity for judicial review 
was minimal, and no private right of action was created by the Act." Terry Morehead Dworkin 
& Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the Znterestr of the Employee, the 
Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267,282 (1991) (footnotes omitted). 
138. See Devine & Aplin, supra note 118, at 53. 
139. The WPA made several changes t o  the whistleblower disclosure channel provisions 
of the CSRA. For example, the WPA now permits a whistleblower to  comment upon an 
agency's report after it is submitted to  the OSC. See 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e)(l) (1994). This is an 
important provision because "the whistleblower is often in a good position to  evaluate whether 
the agency's response represents a good faith investigation." Thomas M. Devine, The 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation for the Modem Law of Employment Dissent, 5 1 
ADMIN. L. REV. 53?, 562 n.174 (1999) (quoting H.R Rep. No. 100-274, at 25 (1987)). 
Further, the WPA reduces the risk to whistleblowers themselves by making it more difficult for 
the OSC to reveal a whistleblower's identity. Under the CSRA, the OSC could reveal a 
whistleblower's identity "in order to  carry out the functions of the Special Counsel." See 5 
U.S.C. § 1206(b)(1)(1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-12, $ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16 (1989). 
Under the WPA, the OSC may only identify a whistleblower without his or her consent if 
exposure "is necessary because of an imminent danger to  public health or safety or imminent 
violation of any criminal law." 5 U.S.C. § 1213(h) (1994); see also Devine, supra, at 563-64 
(describing this provision). Importantly, however, the OSC will not accept anonymous 
disclosures and will only protect the confidentiality of  the whistleblower to  the extent 
permitted by § 1213(h). See U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Whistleblower Disclosures (May 4, 
2005), http://www.osc.gov/wbdisc.htm. Of course, this process requires a fair amount of 
trust in the OSC by a federal whistleblowing employee. 
Despite these changes, the WPA's focus was on the Anti-retaliation Model, not the 
Structural Model. This failure to give sufficient attention to  the whistleblower disclosure 
channels led one commentator to argue that the WPA "bypassed the process of maximizing 
constructive potential from dissent, a curious omission since one of the WPA's objectives is to 
spark increased challenges of bureaucratic misconduct." Devine, supra, at 561. 
140. The most recent Annual Report from the OSC suggests that the OSC's disclosure 
channel still does not operate consistently to  provide a whistleblower's information to his or 
her agency head. From 2002 through 2004, only about 2.9% of employee disclosures were 
referred to  agency heads for investigation. See U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FISCAL YEAR 
2004 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2005), available at  http://www.osc.gov/library.htm#annual. The 
exact percentage is difficult to obtain from the annual reports submitted by the OSC. During 
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Another problem with the pre-scandal Structural Model was that 
companies had little legal incentive to implement effective 
whistleblower disclosure channels because courts and prosecutors 
rarely penalized bad systems or rewarded good ones.141 Specifically, 
corporations could easily create supeficial structures that satisfied 
the OSG but were ineffective. These structures were often little more 
than "window-dressing," which did little to encourage actual 
whistleb10wing.l~~ Indeed, the recent corporate scandals occurred 
with little outcry from corporate employees despite every appearance 
at the scandal-ridden corporations that sufficient mechanisms were in 
place to encourage detection and reporting of fraud. For example, 
Enron appeared to satisfy the OSG standards for a compliance 
program even though the program was not effective in reality.'43 
Moreover, not only were superficial systems easy to create, but also 
the government provided few valuable incentives for companies to 
implement effective reporting mechanisms. Despite the OSG's 
penalty reduction incentive, the OSG's requirement that 
corporations implement "effective compliance systems" rarely helped 
a corporation facing criminal liability. From 1992 to 2005, only 
three organizations received a penalty reduction under the OSG for 
having an effective system.144 
fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, the OSC closed 1841 disclosure matters. Id. During those 
same three years, it referred only forty-eight matters to  agency heads. Id. The closed matter 
numbers do not exactly correspond to agency referrals because there may be some overlap 
from year to year. However, these raw numbers present a stark picture of the continued failure 
of the OSC to serve as the disclosure clearinghouse envisioned by the CSRA and the WPA. 
141. The market could have provided incentives for corporations to  implement effective 
whistleblowing disclosure systems. However, several barriers prevent the market from working 
efficiently in this area. These barriers are addressed infia in Part V.A. 
142. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The 
Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls To Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J .  COW. L. 
267,314 (2003-2004). 
143. See Fiorelli, supra note 126, at 567 & n.lO; see also Charles M .  Elson & Christopher 
J. Gyves, In Re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 691, 702 (2004) (noting that Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Adelphia each had 
compliance systems, "none of which, obviously, was very effectiven). 
144. See Frank 0 .  Bowman 111, Driftin. Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some 
Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing, 
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 684 (2004) (providing information from 1992-2002); see also 
u.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 
54 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2OO5/SBTOC05.htm; U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM'N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tb1.54 
(2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/SBTOC04.htm; U.S. 
Thus, prior to recent corporate scandals, enforcement and 
follow-through weaknesses in the Structural Model prevented 
effective employee whistleblowing. In the private sector, disclosures 
were directed to corporate executives rather than traditional 
corporate monitors, which restricted information flow. An 
organization might have an excellent disclosure structure in place, 
but would simply refuse to support it by actually responding to 
whistleblower disclosures. Ineffective and unsupported disclosure 
channels failed to encourage employees to become whistleblowers 
and, if employees did blow the whistle, their disclosures rarely 
reached parties willing and able to address them. 
C. Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model 
Sarbanes-Oxley implements a new and improved version of the 
Structural Model. Under Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit 
committee of the board of directors of public companies must 
establish procedures for receiving complaints regarding accounting, 
internal accounting controls, or auditing matters.'45 Additionally, the 
audit committee must be able to receive anonymous disclosures by 
employees regarding accounting or auditing matters.146 These 
requirements significantly alter the pre-scandal Structural Model in 
two ways. 
First, Sarbanes-Oxley improves the legitimacy of the disclosure 
channel. It requires that independent directors on the board's audit 
committee receive whistleblower disclosures. This direct line to a 
traditional corporate monitor with the authority and responsibility to 
address whistleblower concerns enables whistleblowers to avoid the 
blocking and filtering from corporate executives. As recognized by 
the SEC when it amended its general rules and regulations by 
implementing Section 301,147 directors typically rely upon company 
managers to provide information, but managers "may not have the 
SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 54 
(2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2OO3/SBTOC03. htm. 
145. 15 U.S.C. $78j-l(m)(4)(A) (Supp. 2002). 
146. Id. $ 78j-l(m)(4)(B). 
147. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees Nos. 33-8220 & 34- 
47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Release] (promulgating 17 
C.F.R $ 240.10A-3, including subsection (b)(3) related to procedures for complaints). 
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appropriate incentives to self-report all questionable practices. 7,148 
Accordingly, the SEC rightfully asserted that "[tlhe establishment of 
formal procedures for receiving and handling complaints should 
serve to facilitate disclosures, encourage proper individual conduct 
and alert the audit committee to potential problems before they have 
serious consequences."149 Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley provides for 
anonymous disclo~ures, '~~ which should improve the willingness of 
employees to come forward with information. Requiring a legitimate 
disclosure channel will unleash the true potential of the Structural 
Model and reveal its power to overcome the information problems 
that undermined employee effectiveness as corporate monitors 
during the corporate scandals. The Model's ability to improve 
information flow is discussed in the next Part. 
Second, for the first time in the private sector, the Structural 
Model is broadly imposed rather than merely encouraged.151 The Act 
instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission to direct the 
national securities exchanges and national securities associations 
(e.g., the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers) to prohibit the listing of any security of a 
company that is not in compliance with this req~irement . '~~ The 
penalty for noncompliance with Section 301 and the corresponding 
listing rules is delisting, which can harm corporations and their 
shareholders significantly.'53 
148. Id. at  18,798. In light of the tremendous malfeasance by managers during recent 
corporate scandals, this seems like somewhat of an understatement. 
149. Id. 
150. See 15 U.S.C. 5 78j-l(m)(4)(B). 
151. The Structural Model also has been imposed in specific instances through consent 
decrees and other settlements by government agencies. For example, in a consent decree with 
the SEC, Qwest Communications agreed to  install a chief compliance officer, with reporting 
obligations to a committee of outside directors, who is responsible for responding to employee 
reports about misconduct. See SEC Charges Qwest Communications International Inc. with 
Multi-faceted Accounting and Financial Reporting Fraud, SEC Litig. Release No. 18936 (Oct. 
21,2004), available at  http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8936.htm (cited in Marc 
I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure when the Whistle 
Blms in the Post Sarbnnes-Oxley Era, 30 J .  CORP. L. 445, 456 11.90 (2005)). With regard to  
discrimination complaints, courts also have been active in approving corporate structural 
reform to address accusations of systematic bias within individual corporations. See Sturm, 
supra note 129, at 509-19, 557 (describing system mandated by consent decree involving 
Home Depot). 
152. 15 U.S.C. $78j-l(m)(l)(A). 
153. See E-mail from Stanley Keller, Chair of Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities, Section of Business Law, Am. Bar Ass'n (Feb. 25, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/ 
Although Sarbanes-Oxley mandated the implementation of the 
Structural Model, Congress did not dictate specific requirements for 
such a reporting system. Moreover, the SEC did not require specific 
procedures when it promulgated rules implementing Sarbanes- 
Oxley's mandate-despite the fact that commentators who 
responded to the proposed rule "were split" over how specific the 
SEC should be.154 The majority of commentators argued that the 
rules should give audit committees the flexibility to develop 
individualized procedures to receive complaints because of the 
diversity of companies affected by the rule.'55 The SEC based this 
minimalist regulatory approach on the diverse needs of a variety of 
corporations, arguing that corporations themselves 
should be provided with flexibility to  develop and utilize 
procedures appropriate for their circumstances. The procedures 
that will be most effective to meet the requirements for a very small 
listed issuer with few employees could be very chfferent from the 
processes and systems that would need to  be in place for large, 
multi-national corporations with thousands of employees in many 
different  jurisdiction^.'^^ 
Following the SEC's lead, both the New York Stock Exchange and 
the NASDAQ merely required that their listed companies have audit 
committees that complied with the SEC's rule.157 
Sarbanes-Oxley thus responds to the failings of the pre-scandal 
Structural Model in two ways. First, the Act implements a 
whistleblower disclosure channel that provides information directly 
to independent corporate directors. As described in the next Part, 
this change directly addresses the flow-of-information problems 
demonstrated by the corporate scandals. Second, Sarbanes-Oxley 
mandates the implementation of a disclosure channel in every public 
corporation. Although this mandatory implementation is an 
improvement, I suggest in Part V of this Article that Sarbanes- 
~les/proposed/s70203/skellerl.htm ("Delisting is a remedy with significant adverse 
consequences both to  the issuer and its shareholders. Realistically, the failure to  conform to a 
corporate governance listing standard in one primary market will leave no alternative 
comparable trading opportunity available for the company."). 
154. See SEC Release, sztpra note 147, at 18,798. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. See NASD Rules § 4350(d)(3) (2005); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual 
5 303A (2004). 
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Oxley's minimalist approach fails to address key potential problems 
with the Model. 
IV. THE POWER OF SARBANES-OXLEY'S STRUCTURAL MODEL 
As utilized by Sarbanes-Oxley, the Structural Model should 
encourage more effective whistleblowing than either the Anti- 
retaliation Model or previous versions of the Structural Model. 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model overcomes the flow-of- 
information problems exposed by the recent scandals by 
implementing a legitimate whistleblower disclosure channel. 
Through its legitimacy, the channel encourages employees to 
become active corporate monitors and to disclose corporate 
misconduct. Equally important, this channel facilitates the 
movement of such information from the employees (those with the 
most information) to the traditional corporate monitors (those with 
the power and responsibility to utilize the information effectively). 
Thus, the Structural Model's power lies in its ability to increase both 
the amount and the effectiveness of disclosures from whistleblowing 
employees. 
A. More Disclosures 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model should increase the amount 
of whistleblowing because it provides incentives for employees to 
become whistleblowers and reduces several of the most significant 
disincentives. By contrast, the Anti-retaliation Model provides little, 
if any, incentive to blow the whistle and addresses, somewhat poorly, 
only one disincentive-the fear of retaliation. 
Studies demonstrate that designating a uniform recipient of 
whistleblower complaints in an organization and directing employees 
to that recipient results in increased amounts of whi~tleblowing.'~~ 
Perhaps one reason for the increase is that employees become 
whistleblowers out of a sense of loyalty to their 0rgani~at ion . l~~ 
158. See Karen L. Hooks et al., Enhancing Communication To h i s t  in Fraud Prevetztion 
and Detection, 13 AUDITING: J .  PRAC. &THEORY 86,92-93 (1994). 
159. As Professor Cass Sunstein has noted with regard to people who dissent publicly: 
There is an ironic point here . . . . Conformists are often thought to be protective of 
social interests, keeping quiet for the sake of the group. By contrast, dissenters tend 
~ - 
to be seen as selfish individualists, embarking on projects o f  their own. But in an 
important sense, the opposite is closer to the truth. Much of the time, dissenters 
benefit others, while conformists benefit themselves. 
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Contrary to popular belief regarding the traitorous nature of such 
"snitches," social science research demonstrates that whistleblowers 
often are employees with long tenure who believe they will serve the 
organization's best interests by providing information about 
organizational wrongdoing.160 The whistleblowers involved in the 
recent corporate scandals seem to satisfy this documented 
generalization. Both Sherron Watkins of Enron and Cynthia Cooper 
of WorldCom profess that they were driven by their sense of loyalty 
to their organizations and that they were disappointed in the 
corporate misconduct that ultimately destroyed their  corporation^.'^^ 
An internal disclosure channel provides a way for employees to 
demonstrate their loyalty by disclosing misconduct without having to 
report colleagues to "outside" authorities. 
A disclosure channel also harmonizes with a whistleblower's 
tendency to report misconduct internally16'-a tendency likely driven 
by this sense of loyalty. Sherron Watkins reported her misgivings to 
Ken Lay, but she did not make a public report until she was called to 
testify before a House committee investigating Enron's bankruptcy. 
Cynthia Cooper reported her findings first to WorldCom7s CFO and 
then to the company's Board of Directors. A similar pattern emerged 
in the scandals at Xerox, Global Crossing, Duke Power, and in the 
mutual fund scandal, whereby an employee attempted to resolve a 
problem internally so that the company could fix it and remain in 
160. See, ea., ALFORD, supra note 102, at 79-80; MICELI &NEAR, supra note 6, at 169- 
70; David Culp, Whinleblowcrs: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial Perspective, 
13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 115 (1995-1996); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, 
at 300-01. 
161. See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 36, at 32 (asserting that Watkis and Cooper, 
along with Coleen Rowley of the FBI, are the "truest of true believers . . . ever faithhl to the 
idea that where they worked was a place that served the wider world in some important wayn); 
Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 53 (describing 
Watkins's reaction); Ripley, supra note 36, at 4 7 4 9  (describing Cooper's reaction to discovery 
of WorldCom's fraud). 
162. See, e.g., MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE 
WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 195 (1989); 
KAREN L. SOEKEN & DONALD R SOEKEN, A SURVEY OF WHISTLEBLOWEM: THEIR 
STRESSORS AND COPING STRATEGIES 160 (1987); Callahan et d., supra note 124, at 195; 
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 300-01; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 335- 
37; Gregory R Watchman, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers: A New Corporate Early Warning 
System, at 8, http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/GAP%2OAnalysis%2OSarbanes%2DOxley"h 
2Epdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
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business.163 This type of situation fits well with the psyche of the 
American employee, whose sense of loyalty to the organization keeps 
her from reporting misconduct externally, but who may report 
internally if encouraged by the 0rgani~at ion. l~~ 
In addition to providing incentives by encouraging loyalty, the 
Structural Model should reduce the most visible disincentives to 
whistleblowing behavior. For example, the Model should reduce the 
amount of retaliation against whistleblowers because the Model 
focuses on the recipient of a whistleblower's complaint rather than 
on the whistleblower. Studies demonstrate that the recipient of 
complaints plays a large role in determining both the outcome of 
each complaint and whether subsequent whistleblowers will feel free 
to come By requiring that the top echelon of a 
corporation receive complaints, whistleblowers are more likely to 
have support from upper levels of the corporation. This "top-down" 
support should reduce the amount of retaliation felt by employees 
and, therefore, encourage more whist leblo~ing. '~~ This structure 
further allows whistleblowers to avoid conflicted supervisors or high- 
ranking managers who are likely to feel defensive about wrongdoing 
occurring in their deparunent.16' Additionally, because Sarbanes- 
Oxley permits employees to report wrongdoing anonymously or 
confidentially, employees' fear of retaliation should be min imi~ed . '~~  
163. See PARTNOY, supra note 51, at 362-63 (explaining the Global Crossing scandal); 
Davis, supra note 42 (explaining the Duke Power scandal); O'Donnell, supra note 41 
(explaining more about the mutual fund scandal); see also Christine Dugas, Whistle-Bluwer Tells 
Stov of Mutual Fund Scandal, USA TODAY, May 26, 2005, available a t  
http://www.yourlawyer.com/articles/read/7377 (explaining the mutual h n d  scandal); 
Whistleblowing: Peep and Weep, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2002, available a t  
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/3002918?f=options (explaining the Xerox 
scandal). This tendency is clear in Watkins's letter to Ken Lay, in which she attempted to  
present solutions for Enron to "fix" the accounting improprieties she discovered. See Letter 
from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay (on file with author). 
164. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 1242 (asserting that encouraging external 
whistleblowing may be ineffective because it is so ingrained in corporate mentality to  be loyal 
and to withhold adverse information). 
165. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 77. 
166. Marcia P. Miceli et al., Can Laws Protect Whistle-Blowers? Results of a Naturally 
Occurring Field Experiment, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 129,134,143-44 (1999). 
167. See MICELI &NEAR, supra note 6, at 184. 
168. Not surprisingly, studies consistently demonstrate that individuals are more willing 
to  state a dissenting viewpoint if they can do so anonymously. See MIETHE, supra note 49, at 
54-57; SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 20. Permitting such anonymous reporting does have 
downsides: often such reports are not as trustworthy and there is little opportunity for feedback 
Thus, the Structural Model implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley most 
likely reduces the significant deterrent of retaliation in a different, 
and perhaps more effective, manner than the Anti-retaliation 
~ o d e 1 . l ~ ~  
The Structural Model also increases employees' confidence that 
their complaints will yield positive results. Studies of whistleblowers 
demonstrate that an even larger concern than retaliation is the fear 
that nothing will be done in response to a whistleblowing 
complaint.170 This concern was justified during the latest corporate 
scandals, as employees in scandal-ridden companies routinely 
watched those who broke the law receive promotions and raises.17' 
Understandably, employees are usually unwilling to take the 
tremendous career and social risks associated with whistleblowing if 
their report has little potential to change the status quo. While the 
Anti-retaliation Model does little to reduce this disincentive, the 
Structural Model addresses it by requiring that disclosures go directly 
to the company's directors, who all have a fiduciary duty to address 
misc~nduc t . '~~  Rather than simply providing information to a 
manager and hoping someone with actual authority receives it, 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model guarantees that the appropriate 
corporate leaders will consider a whistleblower's disclosure. 
Corporate and societal pressures that encourage silence are 
additional disincentives to whistleblowing. Some corporations push 
employees-in the name of organizational loyalty-to go along with 
illegal corporate actions and to refrain from betraying the company 
or follow-up. However, to the extent the Anti-retaliation Model is not working effectively, 
anonymous reporting may encourage those who are othenvise reluctant to  speak out for fear of 
retribution. 
169. The Structural Model also reinforces the Anti-retaliation Model. As a practical 
matter, retaliating against a whistleblowing employee will be significantly more difficult if the 
employee utilizes an internal reporting structure. The employee's disclosure will be 
documented and any subsequent employment action against the employee most likely will 
trigger extra review by the corporation. 
170. See Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 333-37 (citing survey responses t o  assert 
that a primary reason employees do not'blow the whistle is because the employee believes that 
nothing will be done to correct the activity); see also MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 65-66; 
Dworlun & Callahan, supra note 137, at 302; Hooks et al., supra note 158, at 93. 
171. See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 139, 153-54, 187 (describing promotions 
and raises for Andrew Fastow, Ken Rice, and Ben GIisan at Enron). 
172. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
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through d isc los~re . '~~ Additionally, society discourages individuals 
from becoming "squealers" and betraying loyalties.'74 Arguably, it 
simply may be human nature to conform to group norms and to gain 
acceptance from our peers,17' as evidenced by the broad employee 
silence during recent corporate scandals. 
The Structural Model's moderate approach is well suited to 
combat corporate pressure on employees. Such pressure to be silent 
in the face of wrongdoing is particularly problematic because of its 
prevalence, which may cause judges and other decision-makers to 
hesitate before imposing stiff criminal and civil sanctions upon 
managers who use retaliation to enforce employee conformity and 
~i1ence . l~~ Moderate measures are more likely to achieve positive 
results. To paraphrase Dan Kahan's theory regarding sticky norms in 
general, sometimes a "gentle nudge" like the Structural Model may 
be more effective in altering sticky norms, such as employee silence, 
than "hard shoves" like the Anti-retaliation M0de1.l~~ In other 
words, the Structural Model provides a more moderate reform that is 
less likely to alienate persons who encourage whistleblowing. This 
more temperate approach may subtly alter corporate norms of 
secrecy and retaliation to make open communication more viable. 
Implementing a whistleblower disclosure channel will signal to 
employees that the management and ownership of the firm are 
committed to corporate ethics.17* Although Sarbanes-Oxley does not 
173. For example, a whistleblower at Fannie Mae recently stated that other employees 
did not report wrongdoing at the company because of Fannie Mae's corporate environment, 
which he described as "one of intimidation, restraint of dissenting opinions, and pressure to  be 
part of the 'Team,' giving [corporate officers] the numbers [they] desired to  please the 
markets." See Peter Eavis, Fannie's Hedging Deals Look Thorny, Oct. 15, 2004, 
http://ww.thestreet.com/comment/detox/l0187363.html. 
174. See Estlund, supra note 9,  at 123 (citing MICELI &NEAR, supra note 6, at 132-35,. 
175-78); Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 333-37. 
175. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 9; Cunningham, supra note 142, at 317; John M. 
Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagiozrs Ovganizational Corruption, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 1177,1189-92 (2005). 
176. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
6 7  U .  CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (describing the "sticky norms problem" whereby "the 
prevalence of a social norm makes decision makers reluctant to carry out a law intended to  
change that norm"). 
177. Id. at 608; see also Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Ineficient Norms, 144 U .  
PA. L. REV. 1697,1730-31 (1996). 
178. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 30 (advocating the importance of creating a 
culture that "welcomes disagreement and that does not punish those who depart from the 
prevailing orthodoxy," and suggesting that creating "channels by which dissent can be 
enforce employee use of the ~hannel ,"~ the mere existence of a viable 
channel may demonstrate to employees that reporting misconduct is 
appropriate and expected.'80 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Model also indirectly encourages 
whistleblowing by requiring that disclosures go directly to the board 
of directors-a structure that signals the importance of employee 
monitoring and reporting.18' As a result, the actual behavior of 
directors and managers may change because their employees have a 
more formal role in preventing corporate fraud.'82 These corporate 
officers may therefore become more committed to the norm of open 
communication.183 Employees, in turn, will take their cue not only 
from the existence of the structural disclosure channel, but also from 
the acceptance of the channel by their managers and supervisors.184 
This changing social attitude can cascade and expand until a more 
pervasive norm develops, one in which employees understand that 
reporting misconduct is expected and encouraged because 
disclosures ultimately benefit the c~rpora t ion . '~~  
expressed anonymously" might encourage such a culture); Brett H. McDonnell, Sox Appeals, 
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 530 (asserting that "norms of good behavior [can be] as . . . 
important [a] limit on managerial misbehavior" as other disciplinary mechanisms). 
179. Enforcement is geared toward requiring the existence of the channel, not toward 
regulating its use. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15  U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(l)(A) (Supp. 
2002); 1 7  C.F.R § 240.16a-3(a) (2000). 
180. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of l a w ,  144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
- 
2032 (1996) (arguing that even an under-enforced law may serve an expressive function that 
can alter behavior in "signaling appropriate behavior and in inculcating the expectation of 
social opprobrium and, hence, shame in those who deviate from the announced norm"). 
18 1 .  See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 104 ("If the firm's commitment to 
certain behaviors can be communicated successfully, this should be a strong pull. And if other 
agents publicly signal their adherence to  the policy, conformity pressures will go to  work as 
well. A positive compliance culture will evolve."); cf: Estlund, supra note 77, at 375 (noting 
that Sarbanes-Oxley plays an important role "by protecting and institutionalizing employee 
whistleblowing"). 
182. Cf Kostant, supra note 69, at 556-58 (arguing that corporate lawyers may become 
better corporate watchdogs because of their more formalized role under Sarbanes-Oxley). 
Professor Kostant's arguments that Sarbanes-Oxley may change the social norms for attorneys 
support the argument that a formalized structure for reporting misconduct may alter the social 
norm against whistleblowing that exists in many corporations. See id. 
183. See Kahan, supra note 176, at 635-36. 
184. See id. 
185. See Sunstein, supra note 180, at 2033 (discussing the development of "norm 
cascades, as reputational incentives [that] shift behavior in new directionsn) (citing TIMUR 
KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE 
FALSIFICATION 3 (1995)). 
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Accordingly, under the Structural Model, not reporting may 
actually be seen as disloyal, and those who stand mute in the face of 
wrongdoing may be considered defectors from the norm, subject to 
social sanctions, such as ostracism, or even employment sanctions, 
such as discipline for not reporting rn iscond~ct . '~~ For example, 
when WorldCom emerged from bankruptcy as MCI, the company 
conducted an intensive internal investigation and fired fifty 
employees, many of whom were not involved in the fraud but who 
likely knew about it.lg7 Structural encouragements can become self- 
hlfilling as they are given legitimacy by legal and human resource 
professionals within the corporation.lg8 As Professor Peter Kostant 
has argued, "a slight adjustment, or clarification of social meaning, 
can powerfdly affect norms of behavior."1g9 
This theoretical approach to social norms finds support in 
research regarding influences on whistleblowing behavior. Studies 
demonstrate that internal whistleblowing increases when ethical and 
legal compliance policies exist in an organization,lgO particularly if 
specific whistleblowing procedures are in place.lgl Such reporting 
procedures give whistleblowers more power by officially providing 
encouragement and ~ r0 t ec t i on . l~~  Indeed, two of the most 
prominent social science researchers of whistleblowing behavior 
contend that the best approach for encouraging whistleblowing is to 
"set up internal complaint procedures where concerned employees 
could report, and make sure that those procedures provide for 
speedy and impartial review."lg3 
Thus, whistleblowing will likely increase if the attitudes of 
corporate players and the corporation's social norms encourage it.lg4 
It is commonly argued that in order to encourage whistleblowers, 
corporations need to develop a more ethical and open culture, 
- 
- - - 
-- - 
186. See id. at 2029-30. 
187. See McCafferty, supra note 74. 
188. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The 
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J .  SOC. 1401, 1406-17 (1990). 
189. Kostant, supra note 69, at 553. 
190. See Trevino, supra note 25, at 1198-1201. 
191. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6 ,  at 150. 
192. See id. at 223. 
193. Id. at 249; see also Dworkin, supra note 102, at 474. 
194. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6,  at 158-60; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, 
at 326. 
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implemented from the top of the organizational hierarchy.'95 Yet, 
beyond relying upon enlightened corporate leaders, specific 
recommendations regarding how society can implement such a 
corporate culture are rare because it is difficult-if not impossible- 
for the government to mandate a culture of honesty. Sarbanes- 
Oxley's Structural Model might provide a means to encourage the 
development of such an ethical corporate culture by mandating both 
a process for whistleblowers to follow and a high-level recipient for 
whistleblower disclosures. 
There are obvious limitations to the ability of the Structural 
Model to turn employees into corporate monitors. Like any 
corporate monitor, employees suffer from cognitive biases that may 
inhibit them from spotting and reporting wrongdoing. For example, 
in the face of ambiguous evidence of wrongdoing, employees tend to 
interpret information to avoid ~ 0 n f l i c t . l ~ ~  Also, employees have a 
"cognitive conservatism" that makes it difficult to readjust one's 
perspective to account for new information,19' particularly if, as some 
theorize, corrupt corporate behavior begins with acts that are only 
minimally improper, which then gradually expand into larger acts of 
wrongd~ ing . ' ~~  When combined with a bias for the status quo and a 
tendency to perceive information as normal rather than abnormal, 
employees face difficulties as unbiased corporate monitors.'99 
These difficulties suggest that employees should not be a 
corporation's sole source of monitoring. But, employees can, and 
should, be one part of the overall corporate monitoring system. As 
part of that system, a visible and legitimate whistleblower disclosure 
channel that encourages and responds to the reporting of 
misconduct may cause employees to give credence to their own 
concerns by challenging their inherent assumptions and biases. The 
structure of an effective disclosure channel will reduce disincentives 
to coming forward by reducing corporate and societal pressures to 
remain quiet. When implemented in conjunction with anti- 
195. See Westin, supra note 54, at 143-49. 
196. See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 86-87 (describing this tendency as "motivated 
inference"). 
197. See id. at 87-88. 
198. SeeDarley,supranote 175,at 1 1 8 6 8 8 .  
199. See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 86-90 (discussing these same attributes as they 
apply to whether supervisors can capably monitor employees to prevent wrongdoing). 
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retaliation protections, the Structural Model should encourage more 
whistleblowing from corporate employees. 
B. Less Blocking and Filtering 
A second significant benefit of the Structural Model is that it 
should increase whistleblowers' effectiveness by providing a channel 
for employees to bypass potential blocking and filtering by corporate 
executives and to report information directly to the board of 
directors. Moreover, because the channel to the board is relatively 
unfiltered, such information may prompt directors to critically 
examine information received from the corporate managers that 
might be contradictory to that of the employee. This critical 
examination is likely because directors "have a tremendous 
reputational stake in compliance with the law, and almost no 
countervailing financial stake in its violation . . . [therefore, they] are 
likely to insist on correcting internal problems rather than covering 
them up. 7,200 Providing reports to the traditional monitors, 
particularly the board of directors, will be the key to the Model's 
success. 
Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model makes it more 
difficult for directors to ignore the information received from 
whistleblowing  employee^.^^' One problem with the traditional 
monitoring system is that it relies upon a liability system that makes 
proof of a monitor's breach of fiduciary care extremely difficult 
unless direct knowledge of wrongdoing is demonstrated. Thus, the 
traditional system encourages directors to avoid receiving 
information about potential misconduct in the corporation because 
there is no breach of fiduciary duty when the directors have no direct 
knowledge of wrongdoing. 
The Structural Model makes it more difficult for directors to 
avoid the type of knowledge that makes them responsible for 
corporate wrongdoing. Most whistleblowing systems provide 
effective documentation of information passed from an employee to 
the responsible monitor. Indeed, afier the recent corporate scandals, 
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were amended to require 
that the organization's "governing authority7'-most likely the board 
200. Kostant, supra note 69, at 556 (citing David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate 
Law, 149 U .  PA. L. REV. 1811,1812 (zuul)). 
201. See Developments in the Law, supra note 71, at 2247 11.134. 
of directors-must have knowledge about, ar,d exercise reasonable 
oversight of, the compliance program.202 Part of this oversight must 
include receiving annual reports from individuals who are 
operationally responsible for the program.203 Similarly, under 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model, directors could not claim-as 
they did with Enron-that they were unaware of potential 
misconduct. Although directors may still ignore or underestimate the 
information because it comes from a source outside of their small 
g ro~p ,2"~  they will do so at their own peril. At a minimum, a 
disclosure channel forces directors to either confront officers with 
the information or be liable for their failure to do so. In this way, the 
Structural Model reinforces the already-existing duties and 
obligations of the traditional monitors. 
Thus, by circumventing the blocking and filtering of corporate 
executives, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model will make 
whistleblower disclosures more effective because disclosures to 
directors are more likely to cause the corporation to address the 
misconduct of its executives and managers. 
C. Secondary Benefits 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model is likely to provide significant 
benefits directly to the corporation and thereby gain organizational 
acceptance. Indeed, the history of the Structural Model 
demonstrates that such organizational acceptance is crucial for the 
Model to work. For example, the disastrous reign of two Special 
Counsels eviscerated the disclosure provisions of the Civil Service 
Reform Act because they did not follow through on employee 
disclosures effectively.205 For organizational acceptance to occur, the 
benefits of this Model to the corporation must outweigh its costs. A 
corporation will implement a truly workable and effective disclosure 
system when encouraging whistleblowers is in its best interest. 
Fortunately, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model could provide 
significant benefits directly to the corporation. 
-- -- - 
202. OSG, supra note 125, § 8B2.l(b)(2)(A), Application Note 1.  
203. Id. $ 8B2.l(b)(2)(C), Application Note 3. 
204. See Fanto, supra note 24, at 460-72. 
205. See discussion supra Part 1II.B. 
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1 .  Encouraging internal whistleblowing 
An important benefit for corporations is that the Structural 
Model encourages internal ~ h i s t l e b l o w i n g . ~ ~ ~  When an employee 
reports wrongdoing internally rather than externally, corporations 
learn about mistaken employee views and perspectives before these 
mistaken views are made public, at which point they are harder to 
correct.207 This early detection allows corporations to avoid costs 
related to the negative publicity and government intervention that 
follows external whis t l eb l~wing .~~~  It also gives corporations the 
opportunity to correct misconduct earlier and thereby save costs 
related to future litigation.209 Furthermore, internal whistleblowing 
may attract whistleblowers who are loyal to the corporation and thus 
are motivated to improve the corp~ra t ion .~ '~  These whistleblowers 
also are less likely to experience retaliation when they report 
internally rather than externally.*ll 
One criticism of encouraging internal whistleblowing is that it 
may not be beneficial for society because misconduct is more easily 
hidden and covered up if it is reported internally.212 However, 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model should reduce this negative 
aspect of internal whistleblowing by directing whistleblower reports 
to corporate monitors who are subject to sanctions for failing to 
investigate and disclose material misconduct.213 Moreover, the 
Structural Model does not prohibit external whistleblowing-it 
206. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY 
DISCHARGE 169 (1991) ("Employees may be less likely to complain outside their 
organizations if they believe that their companies have effective internal mechanisms for 
expressing dissent and achieving change."); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 300-02. 
207. See Callahan et al. ,  supra note 102, at 904-06; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 
137, at 299-300; Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They 
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241,243 (1987); Vaughn, supra note 89, at 599. 
208. See Callahan et al., supra note 102, at 882, 904-06; Dworkin & Near, supra note 
207, at 242. 
209. See Culp, supra note 160, at 124, 132; Robert G. Vaughn et al., The Whistleblower 
Statute Prepared for The Organization of American States and The Global Legal Revolution 
Protecting Whistleblowers, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 857,868 (2003). 
210. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 299-300. 
211. See id. at 302; Dworkin &Near, supra note 109, at 6. 
212. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 284; Stewart J. Schwab, Wronaful 
Dischavge Law and the Search for Third-Paq Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1966-68 (1996). 
213. See Cheny, supra note 8, at 1073 (noting that the reporting channel of Sarbanes- 
Oxley would provide evidence for government investigators and plaintiffs attorneys regarding 
corporate knowledge of wrongdoing). 
simply facilitates internal whistleblowing in order to encourage a 
greater overall amount of whistleblowing. 
2. Better corporate decision-making 
To the extent that a corporation truly implements structural 
changes that improve the flow of information, corporate decision- 
making should improve.214 Boards of directors need to be open to 
different and dissenting points of view in order to improve the 
quality of their d e c i s i ~ n - m a k i n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Evidence from studies of 
corporate boards demonstrates that "companies do best if they have 
highly contentious boards 'that regard dissent as an obligation and 
that treat no subject as undiscussable.' Well-functioning boards 
contain a range of viewpoints and encourage tough questions, 
challenging the prevailing orthodoxy."216 In accordance with this 
viewpoint, Professor James Fanto suggested improving the board of 
directors by appointing outside directors to play a "whistleblowing" 
function in order to combat pervasive "group think."217 Sarbanes- 
Oxley's Structural Model augments this suggestion by directing 
actual whistleblowers to disclose information to the board of 
directors, thereby providing the board information with which to 
make more informed decisions. 
On a broader note, the Structural Model also helps encourage 
dissent more generally by encouraging employees to speak out 
immediately and directly. This process may lead to better decision- 
making for the corporation because groups make better decisions 
when a variety of viewpoints are considered.218 Without dissent from 
individuals, groups tend to conform to more extreme positions- 
positions not held individually by most of the members of the 
Moreover, dissenters can play an important role in breaking 
informational cascades, in which a group of people uniformly fall in 
line with a few influential people who may or may not have complete 
214. See, e.B., MICELI &NEAR, supra note 6 ,  at 228-29. 
215. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 2; O'Connor, supra note 23, at 1304-06; Westin, 
supra note 54, at 138-39. 
216. SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 2 .  
217. See Fanto, szrpra note 24, at 507-09. 
218. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 9 ("[C]lose-knit groups, discouraging conflict and 
disagreement, often do badly because of this type of  conformity. The problem is that people 
are failing to disclose what they know and believe."). 
2 19. Seegenerally id. at 11 1-44 (discussing "group polarization"). 
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access to full information.220 The essential problem with such 
cascading is that individuals with a minority view often self-censor in 
the face of this group pressure, which keeps valuable information 
from the group and leads to inferior decision-making.221 Through a 
disclosure channel, whistleblowers can provide an important 
dissenting voice which may improve a corporation's decision- 
making, particularly at the board level. 
3. Reducing monitoring costs 
Despite the many benefits of prompt and efficient 
whistleblowing, whistleblowing-like any monitoring mechanism- 
has its costs. Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model, however, minimizes 
those costs and, where appropriate, reduces the costs of 
whistleblowing more effectively than the Anti-retaliation Model. 
The Structural Model has obvious costs associated with 
maintaining a structure to receive, disseminate, and investigate 
employee disclosures.222 These costs, of course, vary depending upon 
the complexity of the system223 and may affect smaller companies 
more than larger ones.224 However, when the SEC enacted rules 
implementing the structural changes of section 301, it did not 
receive any specific data in response to its request for information 
related to possible costs of such ~ ~ s t e m s , 2 2 ~  perhaps signaling that the 
cost of such structures is not overwhelming for public companies.226 
220. See id. at 66-73. 
221. See id. at 118. 
222. See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,813 (noting that there will be "ongoing 
costs" in establishing procedures for handling complaints and in monitoring compliance with 
those procedures). 
223. Cf: Matthias Schmidt, 'TVhistle BlowingU Rt.gulation and Accounting Standards 
Enforcement in Germany and Europe-An Economic Perspective 26 (Humboldt Univ. Bus. & 
Econ. Discussion, Paper No. 29, 2003), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=438480 
(noting that for intemal whistleblowing rules to be effective, tremendous company resources 
may be required, such as continuous training for management and employees, implementing 
hotlines, and identifying ombudspersons). 
224. See SEC Release, strpra note 147, at 18,816. 
225. See id. at 18,814. 
226. Anecdotal evidence also supports the notion that companies may not find the cost of 
certain disclosure systems prohibitive, particularly when compared with the benefit of increased 
employee monitoring. See generally Judy Dahl, Whistle-Blower Program Lets Employees Speak 
Up, DIRECTORS NEWSLETTER (Credit Union), Dec. 2005 (on file with author) (describing 
the whistleblower hotline implemented by Texas credit union, which the credit union's 
intemal auditor called a "bargain"). 
In addition to the mechanical nuts and bolts of implementing a 
reporting system, opportunity costs must be considered. Executives 
and managers monitored by employees might forgo activity that is 
profitable and legal, but that may put them at risk of being 
reported.227 Shareholders might want these executives and managers 
to test, or even to cross, the boundaries of legality because at times it 
may be more profitable for shareholders if a corporation violates the 
law, particularly if the penalties and the chance of being caught are 
Yet corporations already incur these opportunity costs 
because of current employee monitoring unrelated to the Structural 
Model. As Professor Larry Backer has noted, 
[Mluch of the obligations imposed on directors, officers and 
gatekeepers, all fall on employees. Employees are usually the people 
who actually gather the information necessary for the b c t i o n i n g  
of the due diligence, monitoring, or information systems mandated 
by [Sarbanes-Oxley] and related statutes. Employees tend also to 
be responsible for first cut analysis and decisions with respect to  the 
relevance of particular bits of information. T o  a large extent, a large 
firm must rely on its employees, a large number of whom must be 
trusted to  gather, analyze and produce information that is essential 
for the compliance by responsible officers, directors and 
gatekeepers of their legal obligations.229 
Increasing the role of employees in corporate governance by 
encouraging them to report misconduct may not dramatically 
increase these opportunity costs. While employees are already asked 
to monitor, corporations fail to offer an incentive to accurately 
report their findings to corporate leadership. Thus, because all 
monitoring mechanisms have costs that must be considered in 
227. See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 284; see also MIETHE, supra note 49, at 87 (noting 
that over-surveillance o f  employees can lead to employees that are overly cautious). 
228. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6 ,  at 10 ("[Elthical issues aside, from a 
shareholder's standpoint, illegal acts may be worthwhile if their expected benefits outweigh 
their expected costs. In addition, some investors may view managerial attempts to test the legal 
waters as preferable to always proceeding in a risk-averse manner. Wealth-maximizing 
shareholders may consider it desirable for managers to occasionally get caught uying to cheat." 
(quoting Wallace N. Davidson I11 & Dan L. Worrell, The Impact of Announcements of 
Corporate Illegalities on Shareholder Returns, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 195, 198 (1988) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))). 
229. Larry Cati Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing 
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327,370. 
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comparison to the costs of other c0ntrols,2~~ it is noteworthy that the 
marginal opportunity costs of encouraging employees to report 
misconduct may not be significant given employees' current 
monitoring roles. 
Another cost of encouraging whistleblowing (and the 
monitoring that goes along with it) is that a corporation may 
discover wrongdoing for which it may be liable to some third 
party.231 When a company exposes its own employee's wrongdoing, 
it can incur financial penalties, litigation expenses, negative publicity, 
and increased scrutiny by regulators.232 This cost is not uniform 
among companies and will be greater for those corporations that are 
engaging in fraudulent activities.233 Assuming most companies are 
not acting illegally, this overall cost may be insignificant for the vast 
majority of corporations.234 
Furthermore, these costs may seem higher to corporations than 
they really are because managers often confuse their own personal 
costs with costs to the corporation. As Professor Richard Painter 
notes, "[mlanagers often lose their careers if misconduct is disclosed, 
whereas organizations may suffer only temporary loss of reputation. 
Managers usually bear the brunt of criminal liability for misconduct, 
whereas organizations do not go to jail. 7,235 In short, while 
corporations may actually benefit from getting caught early because 
wrongdoing is thereby forestalled, managers may underemphasize 
these benefits because getting caught can be a personal disaster for 
managers.236 A corporation's agents-its managers and executives- 
may not implement protections that would benefit the corporation 
itself because of the increased risk to the agent. The Structural 
230. Cf Kraakman, supra note 19, at 75-87 (discussing costs of legal enforcement 
through third-party liability). 
231. Cf Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of 
Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 224 (1995) (noting that an 
obvious cost to clients o f  engaging an attorney who will be a whistleblower is the "cost o f  
misconduct being exposed"). 
232. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6,  at 282; see also ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, 
WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS-AND WHY 75 (2003). 
233. See Painter, supra note 231, at 224,263. 
234. See id. at 224. 
235. Id. at 263-64. Of course, management turnover may impose its own costs, such as 
replacement costs and a "loss o f  cohesion within the organization." See Langevoort, supra note 
181, at 295-96. 
236. See Painter, supra note 231, at 263-64 
Model addresses this "agency failurev-whereby managers 
"overemphasize costs and underemphasize benefits" of getting 
caught?37-because it increases corporate compliance and facilitates 
earlier detection of corporate fraud. 
Another cost of whistleblowing comes from likely error, 
including intentional error by purported whistleblowers. 
Whistleblowers could use the system opportunistically to gain some 
sort of job security by disclosing imaginary miscond~ct ,2~~ to achieve 
an advantage in promotion or salary by wrongly reporting a co- 
employee,239 or simply to hurt the employer in retaliation for some 
perceived slight.240 Alternatively, reporting errors could occur simply 
because an employee does not hlly understand an ambiguous and 
complex situation in which it might be difficult to discern legal from 
illegal conduct.241 The costs of such erroneous claims include costs 
associated with internal investigations, litigation expenses, 
opportunity costs, potential penalties, and costs related to becoming 
a possible target for government regulators.242 
The Structural Model can reduce the costs of whistleblowing 
errors, whether made maliciously or in good faith, because the 
Model channels whistleblower disclosures internally rather than 
237. See id. at 264-65. 
238. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 7; Ribstein, supra note 17, at 286; Schmidt, 
supra note 223, at 21; Westin, supra note 54, at 134. The costs here mirror the typical list of 
costs that are asserted regarding any restriction on a corporation's ability to  fire its employees 
at-will. See James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 60 U .  
COLO. L. REV. 91, 99, 123 (1989) (arguing that inhibiting the right of an employer to fire an 
employee will raise the cost of labor because it reduces the ability to  fire inefficient employees, 
which makes the em~lover's workforce less efficient. and thus more costlv. and it will also raise 
. , . , 
the costs of administrating the employment relationship because it will lead to  spurious claims 
that increase litigation and administrative expenses). See ~enerally Steven L. Willborn, 
Individrral Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 
6 7  NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988). 
239. Cf: Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 884 (1981) (Ryan, J., 
dissenting) (expressing concern about protecting whistleblowers in the workplace because it 
encourages employees to turn in other employees). 
240. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty 
and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279,298 (1971). 
241. See id.; see also Westin, srrpra note 54, at 134 ("Putting the whistle to  one's lips does 
not guarantee that one's facts are correct."). 
242. See Gerald Vinten, Enortgh is Enottgh: An Employer's View-The Pink Affair, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING-SUBVER~ION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP?, supra note 7, at 118-32 
(describing the costs incurred by an employer that investigated thoroughly but could not 
substantiate a whistleblower's claims); Kraakman, supra note 19, at 60. 
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externally.243 Although there will be investigative costs, a corporation 
that receives erroneous disclosures internally at least has the 
possibility of providing feedback and correct information to a 
whistleblowing employee.244 This early response may keep a good 
faith whistleblower from going public with flawed information, thus 
reducing the overall costs of defending against such charges. 
Moreover, even when a good faith whistleblower makes a public 
accusation in the face of contrary evidence, the company will have 
investigated the complaints and will be able to explain publicly the 
reasons why those complaints were disregarded after the internal 
investigation.245 
With regard to malicious whistleblowers who intentionally make 
false claims, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model may actually reduce 
costs associated with such accusations. Employers likely will 
document any whistleblowing disclosures made through the 
approved channel as well as any subsequent investigation, which may 
lessen the factual "he said/she said" nature of whistleblowing claims 
regarding when a disclosure was made, the content of the disclosure, 
and the relationship of the disclosure to an employment action. 
Moreover, whistleblower disclosures may never be provided to 
supervisors who make employment decisions, thus shielding these 
supervisors from unintentionally retaliating against a whistleblower. 
Furthermore, the Structural Model will enable corporations to 
prevent intentional retaliation by fmstrated managers, which also will 
reduce litigation expenditures. 
Finally, a common argument against promoting whistleblowing 
is that it will undermine corporate culture by encouraging secrecy, 
destabilizing management authority, and diminishing morale.246 
Each of these phenomena represents potential costs for a 
corporation. Whistleblowing may damage a corporation's ability to 
maintain confidential business information, thus forcing it to create 
systems to maintain secrecy of its vital corporate inf~rmat ion .~~ '  It is 
costly to create these additional systems, and further costs are 
243. It should be noted that incidents of malicious whistleblowing are rare. See Dworkin 
& Callahan, supra note 137, at 303. 
244. See id. at 304. 
245. See Westin, supra note 554, at 150. 
246. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 333; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9 ,  
at 343. 
247. See Blumberg, supra note 240, at 297. 
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incurred because the systems inefficiently restrict the normal sharing 
of corporate inf~rmat ion.~~ '  Similarly, whistleblowing can undermine 
the organizational chain of command, which may reduce the 
efficiencies gained by having a clear corporate decision-making 
~ t r u c m r e . ~ ~ ~  In fact, any decrease in the authority of management 
imposes costs, as managers must spend additional time justifying 
themselves and their commands.250 Reduced morale, among both 
executives and employees, also may lead to less productivity and 
efficiency. In its extreme version, this argument analogizes a culture 
of whistleblowing to the type of informing that is encouraged by 
tyrannical regimes.251 
Certainly an overly-rigorous surveillance program may lead to 
"risk-aversion and frustration that stem from the fear that one will be 
incorrectly second-guessed. "252 Yet the actual effect of increased 
encouragement of whistleblowing on a corporation's culture is 
unclear. As an initial matter, the concern that encouraging 
whistleblowing will cause corporate disruption seems to lack 
demonstrable support in the extensive social science research 
regarding whistle blower^.^^^ As mentioned above, this research 
supports the opposite conclusion: that whistleblowers typically are 
loyal employees dedicated to the organization's goals.254 
Furthermore, most employees are accustomed to surveillance by 
managers and other superiors through performance reviews and 
evaluative metrics, such that additional monitoring is unlikely to 
affect morale negatively. Moreover, the Structural Model encourages 
whistleblowing within the corporate system, which should work to 
maintain corporate secrets rather than exposing them to outsiders. 
Sarbanes-Oxley's emphasis on internal whistleblowing should also 
248. See id.; Kraakman, supra note 19, at 60. 
249. See JOHNSON, supra note 232. 
250. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 9-10; see also Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 
A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. 1974) (denying whistleblower claim because whistleblower bypassed 
immediate supervisors in his reporting and breached the chain of command, and approving of 
the company discharging him "to preserve administrative order in its own house"). 
251. See Peter F. Drucker, What is "Business Ethicsw?, 63 PUB. INT. 18 (1981). 
252. See Langevoort, supra note 27, at 309. 
253. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 137, at 303-04 (summarizing research and 
concluding that "[flears that internal whistleblowing is disruptive of employee control and 
productivity, or that it serves purely private interests, are unsupported by social-psychological 
research" (citation omitted)). 
254. Id. at 301-03. 
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keep the potential for organizational disruptions to a minimum 
because it reinforces, rather than undermines, the corporate 
hierarchy. By providing information to the board of directors rather 
than to corporate management, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model 
emphasizes the primacy of the board of directors as a regulatory 
player in the corporate structure. 
4. Increasing employee voice 
Whistleblower disclosure channels also benefit corporations by 
giving corporate employees greater voice through an additional 
avenue of participation in corporate governance.255 With union 
membership on the decline, the opportunity for employee 
participation in the workplace has been greatly reduced, leading to 
higher worker turnover and lower worker satisfaction.256 Providing 
the employee with more voice and participation in the workplace by 
encouraging whistleblowing can lead to longer employee tenure and 
less turnover.257 Because work is where an employee gets a "sense of 
community and self-worth," increased involvement in corporate 
governance is valuable for an employee.258 Stability is also enhanced 
by the increased morale that occurs "when employees understand 
that they can stop wronghl conduct and contribute to shaping a 
working environment in which they can take pride."259 Additionally, 
corporations benefit from cooperative relationships with their 
employees; such relationships increase corporate productivity by 
encouraging employees to develop firm-specific skills. This will in 
turn increase employee efficiency.260 
255. See Dworkin, supra note 102, at 459; Estlund, supra note 9,  at 108 ("[E]mployee 
participation in workplace governance is increasingly viewed as both an intrinsic and an 
instrumental good."). 
256. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF M O R  
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 29 (1990); Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 607, 624 n.86 (1990) (reviewing WEILER). 
257. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 162-80 
(1984); Estlund, supra note 77; Issacharoff, supra note 256, at 624. 
258. See Estlund, supra note 9, at 108. 
259. Callahan et al., supra note 124, at 196; see also MICELI &NEAR, supra note 6, at 12. 
260. See Estlund, supra note 77. Professor Estlund summarizes the reasons why a 
corporation may not implement such structural protections and reforms on its own, even if 
they increase productivity. Such reasons include (1) the possibility that increased productivity 
may not lead to  increased profits, (2) the difficulty for managers who desire control to 
understand the value to  the corporation of employee voice and participation, and (3) the long- 
Yet, this relationship between employees and employers must 
have structure before these benefits can be and providing 
structural encouragement for employee voice through 
whistleblowing is a good beginning. Incorporating employees as part 
of a broad corporate governance system is not as impractical as it 
sounds; in fact, scholars have suggested involving employees in 
corporate governance for decades.262 For example, much of the 
union movement has rested upon employees becoming more 
involved in their working conditions. The movement to broaden 
corporate accountability to "stakeholders" rather than only 
"shareholders" recognizes employees as important players in the 
corporation.263 Although employee-designated directors are rare in 
the United some large employers initiate "employee 
participation programs," in which employees are involved in 
cooperative efforts with corporate management.265 
Significantly, encouraging whistleblowing regarding financial 
crime under Sarbanes-Oxley may be more successhl than previous 
attempts to encourage whistleblowing regarding other types of 
corporate misconduct because those previous attempts were 
fundamentally adversarial. In the union context, employee voice 
through unionization traditionally has been met with hostility by 
management because of a union's perceived negative effect on 
profitability.266 Similarly, with regard to the health and safety of 
employees or the public, previous efforts to encourage 
whistleblowing required corporations to internalize costs they might 
term benefits of encouraging employee voice may be intangible when compared with short- 
term benefits a corporation believes it receives by reducing employee voice. See id. at 110 n.25. 
261. See id. at 109 ("Employee voice, to  be effective in workplace governance and in 
monitoring regulatory compliance, must be channeled into workable and representative 
structures with power within the workplace . . . ."). 
262. See, ea. ,  Michael H .  LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: 
RedeFning a Labor Ovganization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S .  CAL. L. REV. 
1651, 1653-54 & n.8 (1999) (discussing team-based workplaces). 
263. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State 
Nonshareholder Constituency Stattltes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45,48-50 (1991). 
264. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 1243 (noting that an exception to this rule is 
employee-owned United Air L ies ) .  
265. See, ea. ,  LeRoy, supra note 262, at 1661-66; Robert B. Moberly, The Story of 
Electromation, in LABOR LAW STONES 315, 320-22 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk 
eds., 2005). 
266. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 257, at 181-83. 
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rather externalize.267 For instance, dumping toxic waste may be 
cheaper for corporations to do illegally rather than legally. Increasing 
employee hazards or underpaying an employee for overtime might 
ultimately cost less than complying with employee safety and wage 
legislation. There is thus an inherent conflict of interest in asking 
corporations to encourage whistleblowing when corporations will 
lose money if misconduct is exposed. Financial crime, however, less 
clearly benefits the corporation and its shareholders. Encouraging 
whistleblowing regarding financial crime, which by its nature benefits 
shareholders, might be easier to implement because the 
corporation's self-interest is involved. 
V. STRENGTHENING THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
A. Mandating the Model Efectively 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the first attempt to mandate a 
whistleblower disclosure channel in the private sector. Yet, despite its 
broad application to all publicly-traded corporations, Sarbanes-Oxley 
fails to detail any specifics regarding the disclosure channel. The Act 
requires only a single channel for employees of public companies to 
report questionable accounting or auditing matters.268 This 
mandatory implementation is important and necessary, but it is too 
limited in scope. 
To be sure, government-mandated whistleblower regulation 
affects corporate autonomy and an employer's relationship with its 
employees. Traditionally, such regulations have been justified only 
where whistleblowers patently serve a public In those cases, 
government protection is necessary because corporations would not 
otherwise reap benefits from reporting conduct hurtful to the public, 
such as environmental law violations or improper use of government 
funds.270 Consistent with this rationale, common law courts typically 
267. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1970. 
268. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301,15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(B) (2001-2003) 
269. See, e a . ,  JOHNSON, supra note 232; Schwab, supra note 212, at 1945 (discussing 
protection of whistleblowers who report activities that have "third-party" effects). 
270. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1970. As put by Dean Schwab in 1996, five years 
before Enron declared bankruptcy: 
Certainly, a billion-dollar financial fraud involving elderly pensioners can have 
greater harm on third parties than a trivial oil spill. But in general, companies have 
great internal incentives to police financial fraud, either to  protect their shareholders 
provide greater protections to whistleblowers who disclose 
information that affects a public, rather than a private, interest.271 
When only a private corporate interest is at stake, such as in the case 
of shareholder fraud or internal corporate theft, whistleblowers have 
not fared well in their claims for wrongful discharge.272 In these 
"private interest" cases, it is arguable that a corporation is due more 
deference in its treatment of whistleblowers because the corporation 
has the incentive to determine how much whistleblowing should be 
permitted and encouraged.273 
This same argument can be expanded to question the need for 
government oversight of structural changes to corporate 
whistleblowing. The argument follows that if the Structural Model 
provides such benefits to the corporation by encouraging 
whistleblowers, then perhaps the law should not require these 
reforms. Smart, self-interested corporations will adopt efficient 
whistleblowing disclosure channels and prosper, while those entities 
that do not encourage whistleblowing will founder. 
This argument is in some senses effective. Indeed, the work of 
the market in requiring whistleblower reforms already can be seen in 
the aftermath of the corporate scandals. Various investor and 
or their reputation among creditors. Companies often cannot capture the gains from 
an action that protects public health or safety, and thus that factor often remains 
external t o  their calculus. Allowing a wrongful discharge action to  be asserted by 
employees fired for blowing the whistle on actions against public health and safety is 
one small way t o  encourage companies to  internalize these costs. 
Id.; see also Cynthia Estlund, WronClfirl Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX.  L. 
REV. 1655, 1674 (1996) (asserting that actions that are protected from retaliation benefit 
third-parties and are "public goods that are likely to be 'underproduced' even without the 
threat of retaliation"). 
271. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1970. 
272. For example, whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing have not been 
particularly successful in wronghl discharge suits. See, ed., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 
F.2d 1303, 1305-07 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding discharge of employee for preparing to  
disclose commercial bribery and alteration of records); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 
P.2d 373, 375, 380 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to  protect employee who internally reported that a 
supervisor was under investigation for past embezzlement); Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 
778, 788 (Okla. 1995) (refusing to protect employee who internally reported embezzlement 
by a supervisor); Fox v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Utah 1997) (finding 
that employee was not wronghlly discharged because employee's internal disclosure regarding 
statutory violations did not implicate a clear and substantial public policy). 
273. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1949 (noting that a corporation "is in the best 
position to  weigh whether the information the employer gains from co-worker tattling is worth 
the cost of breakdowns in the corporate chain of command and reduced trust among 
coworkers"). 
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industry groups pressured corporations to utilize their employees to 
help detect fraud and other criminal activity. For example, in 2005 a 
group of Wal-Mart's institutional shareholders requested that the 
company review its internal controls, in part because of concern that 
the company weakened the resolve of its employees to report 
wrongdoing when Wal-Mart fired an employee who disclosed 
alleged accounting abuse by the corporate vice-chairman.274 
Similarly, the chairman of Nortel Networks recently disclosed that 
no employee at any level of the company alerted the board to 
accounting improprieties that were revealed the previous year.275 In 
response, the corporation publicized to its shareholders that it 
voluntarily instituted a "whistleblower system" for employees to raise 
concerns to an officer who "answers to" the CEO and the chairman 
of the board.276 
Other market forces may encourage whistleblowers to report 
matters externally if internal whistleblowers are not supported. A 
group called Wal-Mart Watch recently placed thousands of phone 
calls to Bentonville, Arkansas, Wal-Mart's headquarters, attempting 
to encourage employees "who know[] of wrongdoing" inside the 
company to come forward with information.277 In short, from the 
"free market" perspective, the market and other non-governmental 
forces can and do provide incentives to corporations to encourage 
the disclosure of internal fraud by their employees. 
But these market forces often do not work effe~tively.~~' 
Although the market has begun pressuring large corporations to 
encourage whistleblowers, several barriers exist that may prevent 
274. See James Covert, Wal-Mart Urged To Review Controls, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, 
at B7 (quoting a representative of an institutional investor as saying, "[ilndependent directors 
need to  demonstrate to shareholders that Wal-Mart hasn't built an ostrich culture-where 
employees are better off sticking their heads in the sand than speaking up"). 
275. See David Paddon, Nortel Shareholders Vent Anger cmer Fallen Stock Price, 
Accounting Scandal, CANADIAN PRESS, June 29, 2005, available at  http://www.cbc.ca/cp/ 
business/050629/b062984.html. 
276. Id. In addition, Volkswagen AG recently responded to  disclosures of alleged bribe~y 
and other wrongdoing by corporate executives by announcing that it would hire two 
ombudsmen to receive anonymous employee complaints. See Stephen Power, Volknvagen 
Strengthens Controls In Wake of Internal Bribery Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12,2005, at A4. 
277. See John Hanvood, Washington Wire: Help Wanted, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2005, at 
A4. 
278. Securities regulation is justified, in part, because a collective action problem often 
prevents dispersed shareholders from implementing reforms that could better protect their 
interests. See McDonnell, supra note 178, at 535. 
corporations from voluntarily implementing a sufficient system. For 
example, it may be efficient for corporations not to monitor 
effectively because the law may under-enforce certain regulations- 
either because there is imperfect monitoring or because penalties are 
set too low, or both-thus encouraging certain wrongdoing that is 
profitable.279 Further, it is unlikely that the majority of public 
companies will draw the type of media and investor scrutiny that 
Wal-Mart has encountered. Additionally, managers may implement 
less-than-effective monitoring systems because they personally 
benefit from certain undetected misconduct by their subordinates 
but do not incur significant costs from these violations.280 Moreover, 
even if corporate directors believe that the corporation would benefit 
from increased monitoring by its employees, managers and 
supervisors may block such changes because they resent increased 
monitoring and supervision. By mandating a structural 
whistleblowing approach, the law can relieve pressure on 
corporations and lessen the extent to which supervisors may feel that 
their employers are imposing a whistleblowing system because of a 
lack of u ~ s t . ~ "  
Despite the private-public distinction made by some c0urts,2~~ 
reducing illegal corporate fraud actually affects the larger public 
interest as well as the corporate private interest.283 Corporate fraud 
undermines the public's confidence in the financial market and 
reduces the market's transparency and security.2s4 Moreover, today's 
279. See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 80. 
280. See id. 
281. See Cunningham, strpra note 142, at 293 ("Mandatory controls serve a sanitizing 
function for modulating the trust-suspicion trade-off. Controls mandated by law may be 
imposed by the corporation on  employees without expressing a particularized mistrust of 
them."); Sturm, supra note 129, at 520-21 (noting that the law can help "justify the 
implementation of initiatives lacking short-term economic pay-off, and legitim[ize] the pursuit 
of ethical values of fairness and respectful treatment in the workplace"). 
282. See Schwab, supra note 212, at 1949 (explaining that the private/public distinction 
is often more conclusory than helpful). 
283. See id. at 1970 ("The legislature presumably declared the act illegal in order to 
protect the public from wrongdoing."). 
284. See 148 CONG. REc. S73.52, S7360 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statements of Sen. 
Gramm and Sen. Kerry). As noted by the SEC when it issued rules requiring that audit 
committees set up a system to receive employee complaints: 
[vligilant and informed oversight by a strong, effective and independent audit 
committee could help to  counterbalance pressures to  misreport results and impose 
increased discipline on the process of preparing financial information. Improved 
oversight may help detect fraudulent financial reporting earlier and perhaps thus 
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modern corporations are the center of the economic universe, and 
corporate fraud can harm entire communities-not just corporate 
shareholders.285 Given their large effect on  the public interest, 
whistleblowers may actually be more necessary in the private sector 
than in the public sphere. As Professor Phillip Blumberg noted over 
three decades ago, in the public sphere, an opposition party usually 
will be able to provide oversight regarding the administration of the 
government.286 In a corporation, however, a whistleblower may be 
more necessary because shareholders or a board of directors may not 
be able to control management.287 If effect on the public interest is 
the sine qua non of government intervention, then reducing 
corporate fraud should satisfy this standard, particularly in light of 
the significant public impact of the recent corporate scandals. 
Thus, the government can address weaknesses of the "free 
market" approach by imposing some structural reform.288 Sarbanes- 
Oxley's mandatory approach to whistleblower disclosure channels 
improves upon previous versions of the Structural Model, which 
provided only weak incentives for corporations to implement 
structural change. 
deter it or minimize its effects. AU of these benefits imply increased market efficiency 
due to  improved information and investor confidence in the reliability of a 
company's financial disclosure and system of internal controls. 
SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,813. 
285. Thousands of Enron employees lost their jobs and, as a group, Enron employees 
lost over one billion dollars in retirement accounts containing a high proportion of Enron 
stock. See Kroger, supra note 26, at 58 (noting that local businesses that relied on Enron and 
its employees were negatively affected); Kate Murphy, Corporate Lepers, Local Heroes?, BUS. 
WK. ONLINE,  June 30, 2005, hrtp://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2005/ 
nf20050630-0279-db017.htm ("Enron employees who lost their jobs and retirement savings 
weren't the only people hurt. From local Porsche dealers to  caterers, graphic designers, and 
travel agents, many folks either went out of business or took a tremendous hit because of what 
happened at Enron."); cf: Blumberg, supra note 240, at 299 (noting that large corporations 
can have characteristics of a private government because of their large revenues and substantial 
number of employees and shareholders). 
286. See Blumberg, supra note 240, at 306. 
287. See id. 
288. T o  the extent that a mandatory system remains unappealing, certain required 
disclosures could still encourage the development of whistleblower systems. For example, 
rather than mandate certain disclosure systems, regulators could develop a list of "best 
practices" for such compliance systems. Corporations could comply with these practices or 
disclose why they do not. See Paredes, supra note 18, at 526 (suggesting such a system for 
corporate governance more broadly). Although this is a second-best option, it may prove more 
viable in a regime where mandatory regulation is disfavored. 
But how much regulation should there be? Section 301 imposes 
a minimalist version of the Structural Model: it requires only that a 
public company's audit committee establish procedures for receiving 
complaints regarding accounting issues, including confidential, 
anonymous concerns from employees.289 In many ways, not 
requiring any specific procedures makes sense. Small corporations 
may prefer to outsource the complaint procedure to a third-party to 
handle "hotline" calls. Other corporations may determine that they 
want a more investigative function and appoint ombudsmen or 
ethics officers with broad responsibilities and reporting obligations. 
In fact, social science research suggests that corporate structure 
greatly impacts the type of encouragement necessary to effectively 
encourage whistleblowing, such that a variety of approaches may be 
s u c c e ~ s h l . ~ ~ ~  This diversity of options works well in an economy with 
a wide variety of workplaces. Flexibility encourages experimentation 
with a range of processes and ultimately will help develop various 
best practices for industries and companies.291 
To realize the full potential of the Structural Model as a means of 
improving corporate governance, however, certain specifics could be 
fleshed out and expanded upon through legislation or regulation. In 
particular, Sarbanes-Oxley's vagueness contributes to two significant 
problems with its Structural Model. 
The first problem is that the Model may not work well enou~b. 
Specifically, without supplemental requirements, corporations might 
easily implement a system that looks acceptable on paper but that is 
not hnctional or effective in reality. As demonstrated above, this 
"cheating" problem contributed to the failure of the Model prior to 
the corporate scandals, and Sarbanes-Oxley does not fix the problem 
sufficiently.292 
Conversely, the second problem is that the Model may work too 
well. Employees may make too many complaints about matters that 
do not merit director investigation. In other words, a powehl  
289.  SeeSarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2 0 0 2  $ 301, 15 U.S.C. $78j- l (m)(4)  (Supp. 2002).  
290.  See Granville King 111, The Implications of an Organization's Structure on 
Whistleblowing, 20  J. BUS. ETHICS 315, 324 (1999). 
291.  See Sturm, srrpra note 129, at 492 (discussing structural systems to  address 
employment discrimination issues and criticizing a "one-size-fits-all model or a predetermined 
set o f  criteria" because it would "cut off the process o f  organizational development and 
experimentation that is so crucial to  an effective regulatory system"). 
292. See discussion strpra Part 1II.B. 
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Structural Model may provide too much information, called "noise," 
with only a fraction of the information actually proving usehl. Busy 
corporate directors and officers may spend an inefficient amount of 
time responding to insubstantial employee complaints. 
The hture success of Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model depends 
upon addressing both of these concerns. Below, I suggest solutions 
that involve mandating slightly more structure than is currently 
imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. These suggestions are aimed at 
achieving an efficient level of information flow to directors, while still 
permitting corporations flexibility in constructing whistleblower 
disclosure systems that work best for their organizational 
configuration. 
B. Addressing the Cheating Problem 
Perhaps the most widely cited problem with internal compliance 
systems is that it can be easy for a corporation to "cheat" by 
implementing a superficial and ineffective system.293 Outsiders, 
specifically courts, prosecutors, or other administrative agencies, have 
difficulty judging the effectiveness of a system because "the indicia of 
an effective compliance system are easily The difficulty 
of accurate and thorough outside evaluation allows corporations to 
install programs that look good on paper and permit them to check 
the necessary compliance boxes but have little or no effect on 
whether individuals in an organization commit less crime.295 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model also suffers from this 
criticism. Corporations could implement a facially compliant 
"disclosure channel" relatively easily, yet implicitly discourage the 
use of the channel by director inattentiveness to complaints, lack of 
publicity of the procedures necessary to utilize the program, or 
subtle retaliation against employees who report misconduct. Given 
- ----- 
293. See, ea., Bowman, supra note 144, at 675; Krawiec, supra note 142, at 491; 
Langevoort, supra note 181, at 106-07. 
294. Krawiec, supra note 142, at 491-92; see also Langevoort, supra note 181, at 1 17- 
18. 
295. CJ Krawiec, supra note 142, at 487,491 (noting that such programs may be mere 
"window-dressing" and can have several negative effects, including an "under-deterrence of 
corporate misconduct." and "a proliferation of  costly-but arguably ineffective-internal 
compliance structures"); Langevoort, supra note 181, at 106 (criticizing "values-based" 
programs as being "easy to mimic, making it difficult to  separate out the sincere programs 
from the fakesn). 
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the relative weakness of anti-retaliation laws to protect the more 
subtle forms of discouragement, this cheating problem may 
undermine the effectiveness of the Structural Model if it is not 
addressed. 
Tools typically found in the corporate regulatory regime- 
disclosure and incentives-may significantly mitigate the cheating 
problem. First, corporations could be required to disclose 
information regarding their whistleblowing channels. This disclosure 
could include both a description of the structure of the channel as 
well as its results, such as a summary of evaluative metrics about the 
performance of the structure. Second, corporations could be given 
more incentive to implement a hlly developed and effective 
disclosure channel. One suggestion is that a corporation could be 
provided a safe harbor from certain claims if it satisfies specific 
whistleblower disclosure channel standards through a pre-approval 
process. Surprisingly, although these tools were used in other parts 
of Sarbanes-Oxley to bolster the Act's reform efforts, they were not 
applied to support hrther encouragement of whistle blower^.^^^ 
1. Disclosure of structure and results 
Cheating can be discouraged by requiring companies to disclose 
information regarding both the structure of their whistleblowing 
disclosure channel as well as the channel's results. In fact, disclosure 
and transparency are important principles of limited government 
regulation of markets.297 Requiring disclosure can help directors and 
other monitors perform their oversight functions. These monitors 
will more readily comply with their duties of care and diligence 
because they know that certain decisions and problems will be 
exposed through a corporation's mandatory disclosure.298 
Accordingly, Sarbanes-Oxley recognizes that other areas related to 
internal enforcement should be disclosed.299 Title IV of Sarbanes- 
Oxley requires disclosure related to various financial and ethical 
296. See infia text accompanying footnotes 299-303. 
297. Backer, supra note 229, at 331 n.8; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, 
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 
861 (2003). 
298. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 297, at 872-75. 
299. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (stating 
that the purpose o f  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to "protect investors by improving the accuracy 
and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws"). 
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obligations.300 For example, a corporation must disclose whether or 
not it has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers301 as 
well as any change in, or waiver of, the code for these officers.302 
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that a corporation's annual report must 
contain an "internal control report" that contains an assessment of 
the effectiveness of its internal control structure.303 
As they relate to whistleblowers, however, Sarbanes-Oxley's 
disclosure provisions are narrowly drawn. A code of ethics would not 
necessarily involve whistleblowers, and the disclosures for internal 
controls relate only to financial reporting, which likely would not 
detail the structure of a whistleblower disclosure channel. 
Furthermore, in practice these internal control disclosures from 
management are little more than boilerplate attestations from 
executives.304 
More could be required regarding the disclosure of 
whistleblower channels. SEC regulations could require publication of 
a description of the individuals responsible for top-level review of 
complaints from employee whistleblowers and how that review is 
accomplished, such as whether entire files are reviewed at that level 
or whether and how files are screened. Further, corporations could 
reveal whether the disclosure system is provided internally or is 
outsourced (and to whom), the method by which employees are 
encouraged to report misconduct, and the means by which employee 
concerns are evaluated and investigated.305 In other words, relatively 
specific information about the system could be disclosed. 
300. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §$ 401-09 (codified in scattered sections of title 15 
of the United States Code (Supp. 2002)). 
301. 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (Supp. 2002). 
302. See id. § 7264(b). 
303. See id. § 7262. 
304. See, ea., THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT 117 (2006), available a t  
http://thecoca-colacompany.com/investors/forms/pdfs/form~10K~2005.pdf ("[Mlanage- 
ment believes that the Company maintained effective internal control over financial reporting 
as of December 31,2005."). 
305. See Letter from William F. Ezzell, CPA, Chairman, Board of Directors, & Barry C. 
Melancon, CPA, President, and CEO, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, t o  
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 18, 2003) (providing comments to  SEC 
regarding its implementation of Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: "The company should 
annually disclose whether or not they have a system in place, and whether that system relies on 
internal resources, or they have engaged an external service provider. If substantive changes are 
made to  the procedures during the year, that fact should be reported via Form 8-K and the 
next annual disclosure should provide similar detail."). 
As with other regular corporate disclosures, disclosures relating 
to the whistleblower system could be required in a corporation's 
periodic or annual reports as well as on corporate web site^.^'^ To 
provide a hrther incentive for accurate information, these disclosures 
could be certified by the head of the audit committee in the same 
manner that other important corporate information requires 
executive level certification when it is disclosed to the 
These disclosures also could be posted internally, similar to other 
federal employment law posting requirements,308 so that employees 
have direct knowledge of the procedures and results of employee 
whistleblowing. 
Of course, disclosure is not the answer to every problem. 
Disclosure may be costly for corporations because compiling and 
presenting the required information accurately can be an enormous 
undertaking. Currently, corporations are revolting against Sarbanes- 
Oxley's requirement that they disclose their internal financial 
controls because they claim the costs are staggering.309 Moreover, 
too much disclosure to the market may produce too much 
information for investors, such that the marginal benefit of the 
disclosed information to investors does not justi@ the increased cost 
to the corporation of making the disclosure.310 
306. Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC regulations currently require other information about a 
corporation to be posted on corporate websites, such as statements related to the beneficial 
ownership of securities of a corporation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(4)(C); 1 7  C.F.R § 240.16a- 
3(k) (2006); see also 1 7  C.F.R § 229.406(~)(2) (permitting posting of required corporate 
code of ethics onto corporate website). Similarly, the New York Stock Exchange requires each 
of its listed companies to post its code of business conduct and ethics on their corporate 
website. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.10 
(20061, http://www.nyse.com/RegulationFrameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse 
.com/regulation/listed/l145486468873.html&displayPage=/listed/l022221393251 .html. 
307. See, e.H., 15 U.S.C. 5 7241 (requiring personal certification by officers of various 
publicly disclosed reports); id. § 1350 (requiring personal certification by officers of various 
publicly disclosed reports). 
308. See, e a . ,  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (2000) (requiring the posting of notice to 
employees regarding legal protections of Title VII of  the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
309. See Deborah Solomon, At W h a t  Price?, WALL ST. J . ,  Oct. 17,2005, at R3. 
310. See Letter from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Feb. 18, 2003), a v a i l a b l e  at http://www.sec.g0v/rules/proposed/s70203/ 
pricewaterl.htm (commenting to the SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley: "While we acknowledge the fact that these disclosures may be meaningful to 
investors, we believe that there needs to be a balance between relevant information and 
information overload."). 
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However, the cost of disclosing the type of whistleblower 
channels implemented by a corporation should not be great. It 
would require nothing more than an accurate description of the 
program, which would likely already be in corporate papers 
authorizing it. To  counterbalance these costs, there are many 
benefits to disclosing the whistleblower systems. For example, such 
disclosure will reduce the temptation to implement systems that can 
function as mere window-dressing, an easy way to avoid truly 
encouraging whistleblowers. Corporations, and directors who certify 
the disclosure, will face financial and possible criminal exposure if the 
whistleblower system does not mirror its public description. 
Also, corporations that provide certified public disclosures about 
whistleblower channels would increase shareholder support. Such 
disclosures provide shareholders the opportunity to assess the effort 
corporations undertake to prevent fraud.311 Shareholders may prefer 
companies in which whistleblowing is encouraged through extensive 
whistleblower systems because strong internal control systems may 
lead to less regulatory oversight312 as well as easier access to capital 
through more positive assessments from credit-rating agencies.313 In 
this way, disclosure can provide signaling benefits because it sends "a 
positive message to shareholders and regulators about checks on 
management's conduct."314 To  the extent shareholders value strong 
311. See Schmidt, supra note 223, at 26-29 (arguing that disclosure of compliance 
policies will put market pressure on corporations to  institute whistleblower protections); cf: 
Ribstein, supra note 17, at 291 ("A hlly informed market arguably ought to be able to  
evaluate the adequacy of firms' monitoring and control mechanisms and to  encourage firms to  
efficiently balance the costs and benefits of adopting additional controls."). 
312. See Painter, supra note 231, at 268 (noting that regulators have limited enforcement 
budgets and might direct enforcement activity towards actors it believes have not given proper 
incentives to encourage internal reporting, thus reducing costs because a regulator might 
"require less frequent and less burdensome reporting, request fewer documents, and conduct 
less extensive investigations"); Diya Gullapalli, Living With Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J . ,  Oct. 
17,2005, at R1 (noting that Dow Chemical strengthened its relationship with "key regulators 
at the SEC and the accounting-oversight board" by developing a "reputation for transparency 
and activism in compliancen). 
313. Cf Painter, supra note 231, at 272 (noting that most investors rely on "reputational 
intermediaries" because they cannot process all relevant information themselves). 
314. Id. at 256. But see Letter from Charles M. Nathan, Comm. on Sec. Regulation of 
the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., to  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 
18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/cmnaanl.htm 
(providing comments to the SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of Sarbanes- 
Oxley and recommending that companies be allowed "to choose whether or not they disclose 
their procedures for handling complaints"). 
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internal control systems, the required disclosure of whistleblower 
polices could encourage managers to implement enhanced internal 
controls to increase the company's attractiveness to shareholdet-s.315 
Public information about weak internal controls, on the other hand, 
will inform potential shareholders about risky investments with a 
greater likelihood for fraud.316 
Moreover, disclosure of whistleblower procedures will encourage 
employees to report misconduct by giving them explicit instruction 
on the best means of making whistleblower corn plaint^.^^' Under the 
current Sarbanes-Oxley version of the Structural Model, there is no 
obligation to publicize the existence of the disclosure procedures, 
which may cause employees to underutilize the whistleblower 
channel. This omission is odd given the utilization of such required 
disclosures to employees in other federal employment statutes, such 
as Title V I I . ~ ~ *  
In addition to disclosing information regarding whistleblower 
procedures, the SEC could issue regulations requiring corporations 
to disclose the results of their whistleblower disclosure system. 
Specifically, corporations could disclose information such as the 
number of complaints received by the system, the types of 
complaints (accounting, theft, discrimination, work conditions, etc.), 
and the resolution or procedural posture of the complaints (found to 
be without merit, substantiated, e t ~ . ) . ~ ' ~  Corporations could be 
further required to disclose the current employment status of 
employees who submitted complaints to clarie whether 
whistleblowers suffer any tangible employment action during a 
restricted period after they disclose information.320 Analogously, 
under the NO FEAR Act, federal agencies disclose statistics 
315. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 1277-78. 
316. See MICELI & N m ,  supra note 6, at 14 ("[I]nvestors and potential investors who 
are warned of financial wrongdoing may avoid the loss of substantial resources by investing in 
more ethical or better managed organizations."). 
317. See Near & Dworkin, supra note 112, at 1557; cf: Memorandum from Larry D. 
Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to  Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. 
Att'ys 10  (Jan. 20,2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business-orgmizations.pdf. 
318. See, e a . ,  42 U.S.C. $2000e-10 (2000). 
319. Cf: Callahan et al., supra note 124, at 210 (proposing that ombudsmen prepare 
summaries of complaints received, the investigation, and any actions taken). 
320. Auditors already are protected through a similar mechanism in which corporations 
must report the discharge of an outside accountant. See SEC Form 8 - Y  
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf. 
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regarding the number and type of discrimination complaints each 
agency received from its employees, including the results of those 
complaints.321 
Although reporting such specific results will add cost, the 
marginal cost might not be significant because some organizations 
already use these types of metrics to evaluate their internal 
compliance systems.322 For example, Intel measures the utilization 
rate of its internal dispute resolution system, the number of internal 
versus external complaints, the type of complaints and their 
resolutions, and the perceived effectiveness of the system as 
measured by employee and manager feedback.323 
Publicizing specific results from a whistleblower disclosure 
system might result in several benefits. First, disclosing specific 
results will avoid a "lemon" problem that might develop, whereby 
companies may be unable to signal that they have superior 
whistleblowing procedures if companies with inferior procedures can 
send similar signals.324 Companies, in other words, will be put to 
their proof regarding the results from their system, and they will not 
merely be able to rely on impressive looking window-dressing. 
Corporations will be forced to explain and to justify their disclosure 
channel structure as well as their own evaluation of the structure's 
effectiveness.325 
Second, these public explanations from corporations will assist in 
developing "best practices" and promote experimentation, while also 
321. See Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-174, § 203,301,116 Stat. 566,569,573 (2002). 
322. One recent survey found that seventy-five percent of U.S. public companies tracked 
whether their ethical codes were followed. See Neil Baker, All Done With Mirrors? 
Transparency and Business Ethics, 59 INT'L BARRISTER NEWS 4 , 5  (2005). 
323. See Sturm, supra note 129, at 559 (describing Intel's assessment techniques). Intel is 
certainly not alone in its attempt to  evaluate the success of its own disclosure program. See 
Kenneth D. Martin, Where Theoy and Reality Converge: Three Corporate Experiences in 
Developing "Effectiven Compliance Programs, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 39-40 
(describing metrics kept by Sundstrand Corp. regarding its compliance program) 
324. Cf: George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemonsn: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 8 4  Q.J. ECON. 488, 488-89 (1970) (evaluating quality uncertainty by 
examining good and bad cars); Painter, supra note 231, at 275-76 (describing this problem in 
a market for attorneys who must report wrongdoing). 
325. See Sturm, supra note 129, at 559 (describing a system whereby courts examine the 
effectiveness of an internal grievance system by requiring employers "to develop and justify 
criteria of effectiveness in problem solving for their own internal systems," thereby encouraging 
"employers to . . . evaluate their own systems, rewarding employers who do so"). 
providing courts and regulators a viable means of judging the 
effectiveness of a corporation's own system.326 
Third, publishing results from whistleblowing systems will 
encourage employees to report misconduct by providing them with 
information regarding the effectiveness of their own monitoring 
efforts. As discussed above, a significant disincentive for employees 
to report misconduct is their concern that nothing will be done 
about their report.327 Requiring companies to disclose the results of 
whistleblower disclosures will address this concern by demonstrating 
that violators of ethical and legal norms will be held accountable.328 
Assuming corporations disclose positive results, employees will begin 
to trust the disclosure channel and be more willing to utilize it. 
Furthermore, Professor Tom Tyler has argued that employees are 
more willing to follow workplace rules and think positively about 
their employer when the organization demonstrates that it treats 
employees with procedural fairness.329 Thus, publicizing that the 
system "works" and that procedures are fairly administered not only 
can encourage employees to report misconduct but also can persuade 
employees to behave more appropriately themselves. 
Fourth, publishing results can serve as an important impetus for 
reform. For example, published results of whistleblower disclosures 
under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) revealed that the Office 
of Special Counsel (OSC) and the h4erit Systems Protection Board 
failed to protect and encourage whistleblowers. In the eleven years 
after passage of the CSRA, only one whistleblower received a hearing 
by the OSC to restore the whistleblower's job.330 On appeal to the 
Merit Systems Protection Board, only four out of more than two 
thousand whistleblowers won on the merits of their claims.331 These 
326. See id.; cf: Langevoort, supra note 181, at 114-15 (noting that the "legal standard 
underlying an affirmative monitoring requirement" should "be set at a moderate height," such 
as industry best practices). But see Letter from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton to  U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 18, 2003), hrtp://ww.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s70203/clearygotl.htm ("Disclosure about procedures and changes to  those 
procedures map have m unintended chilling effect. If an issuer is forced to  disclose its 
procedures, the audit committee may be less innovative and less willing t o  try different 
approaches . . . ."). 
327. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72. 
328. See Trevino, supra note 25, at 1200. 
329. See Tom R Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work 
Settingr: 7he Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287,1303-05 (2005). 
330. See Devine, supra note 139, at 534. 
331. Seeid. 
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results served as partial impetus for the passage of the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, which addressed some of the perceived 
problems with the CSRA's whistleblower system.332 
Of course, corporations may still resist disclosure of results. 
Mandatory disclosure requires the corporation to reveal potentially 
embarrassing information publicly and may place employers at the 
mercy of disgruntled employees. Furthermore, disclosing results may 
have the opposite of the desired effect. Rather than increase 
whistleblower disclosures, it may pressure managers to suppress 
complaints in order to make a company's numbers look better.333 
Yet, such disclosure is not markedly different than requiring 
disclosure of earnings and revenue numbers that might embarrass the 
corporation. Both types of disclosures aim to present a clearer picture 
of the corporation to the investing public. As with financial numbers, 
there should be no restriction on a corporation's truthful efforts to 
explain and to just@ poor results. 
2. Providing incentive 
Corporations already receive limited incentives from the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) and various court 
decisions to implement internal compliance systems. But as discussed 
above, the usefulness of these incentives to create eflective systems is 
questionable because the incentives do not necessarily prevent 
cheating.334 Another form of incentive may better encourage 
corporations to install and enforce effective systems that encourage 
employee whistleblowing. 
Corporations could be provided a safe harbor for installing 
systems that meet SEC or other administrative standards for 
effectiveness. Such standards might include specific requirements, 
such as providing for an independent review of whistleblower claims 
and intensive training of managers and employees. This safe harbor 
might be granted through a pre-approval process in which an 
administrative agency (such as the SEC) or a certified third-party 
(such as an independent auditor) rigorously investigates and 
332. See id. at 536 & 11.22; Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 282-83. 
333. Cf: Coffee, supra note 19, at 1251-65 (noting that disclosure can raise a 
corporation's "embarrassment cost" to a "prohibitively high level" that may actually restrict 
information flow). 
334. See discussion supra Part 1II.B. 
evaluates systems for effectiveness. This pre-approval process would 
avoid the tricky inquiry that arises when courts and prosecutors must 
externally evaluate corporate programs a@er misconduct is detected. 
The corporate benefits of pre-approval are also considerable: safe 
harbors could provide a rebuttable presumption that the corporate 
system is effective. Such a presumption would be enormously helpful 
in criminal and civil litigation where proof of an effective 
whistleblower system is significant.335 
The mechanisms that could be used to implement a "safe 
harbor" vary depending on the context. The OSG would necessarily 
need to be amended in order to apply safe harbors to a criminal 
sentencing.336 In the case of punitive damages or sexual harassment, 
legislation may need to be passed to recognize such a safe harbor. 
Yet, even without such legislation, courts might implicitly implement 
such a safe harbor by recognizing "certified" internal control systems 
as meeting industry standards. Importantly, even where a 
corporation had met "safe harbor" standards, it would still be 
encouraged to prevent wrongdoing through other means because 
the presumption would not reduce a company's vicarious liability for 
the acts of its employees.337 
This proposal would provide incentive to implement a m e  
whistleblower disclosure system by reducing a corporation's 
exposure to the extreme punishments imposed upon corporations, 
such as criminal fines and punitive damages. This system would take 
the guesswork out of incentives-based program compliance, such as 
335. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 5 4 5 4 6  (1999) (protecting 
corporations with internal compliance systems from punitive damages); Burlington Indus., Inc. 
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (providing affirmative defense in sexual harassment 
cases); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (providing affirmative 
defense in sexual harassment cases); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B2.1,8C2.5 (2004) (providing substantial reduction 
in penalties for corporation with effective compliance and ethics program). 
336. Admittedly, given the Guidelines' recent amending in 2004 and the current 
uncertainty about their application, any proposal to  amend the Guidelines along these lines 
may have difficulty gaining sufficient support. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,220- 
35 (2005) (finding that the Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment). 
337. See Langevoort, supva note 181, at 114-15 (noting that firms should not be 
absolved of vicarious liability simply for installing monitoring systems because firms need to  
internalize sanctions for wrongdoing in order to have incentive to develop a sound compliance 
program) 
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the OSG, and also ensure that corporations spent an appropriate 
amount of resources on the system.338 
C. Addressing the Noise Problem 
A second problem with the Structural Model is that 
whistleblower disclosure channels may be too successful. They may 
open the floodgates for employee dissatisfactions related to a wide 
range of injustices, real and perceived.339 Indeed, a common 
occurrence after the introduction of a hotline or other disclosure 
channel is for employee complaints to increase.340 This "noise" 
problem could be a significant concern for any system that requires 
reporting to be channeled to directors, such as the system mandated 
by Section 301. Increasing the burden on directors may require 
corporations to compensate directors more generously in order to 
find qualified and independent individuals.341 A particularly active 
whistleblower disclosure channel may only ampli@ these concerns. 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model can be improved to address 
this issue. Specifically, the SEC might promulgate rules permitting- 
but not requiring-certain restrictions on the systems to reduce the 
burden on directors. For example, the SEC could specify that 
directors may outsource the reporting requirement to a third-party 
or permit the corporation to install an ombudsman to supervise the 
system. In either case, the recipient of whistleblower disclosures must 
provide regular reports to the audit committee regarding the number 
and types of complaints made through the system. Furthermore, the 
recipient should be responsible solely to the audit committee, not to 
a corporate executive. This recipient would provide the audit 
338. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 
J .  LEGAL STUD. 833, 842-43 (1994) (noting that corporations will spend less on detection of 
criminal acts if there is not sufficient reduction in fines and penalties for these self-enforcement 
efforts because additional enforcement expenditures would increase expected criminal liability 
by detecting more crime). 
339. Cf: Sturm, supra note 129, at 502 (describing an employee call center that fields 
hundreds of thousands of calls as pan of an internal grievance system at Intel). 
340. See id. at 508 (noting that after the adoption of an internal grievance system at Intel 
"the number of employee complaints increased substantially"). 
341. There is evidence that directors are becoming increasingly burdened by Sarbanes- 
Oxley's numerous requirements. See James S. Linck et al., Effects and Unintended Consequences 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Corporate Boards, AM. FIN. ASS'N 2006 MEETINGS, May 16, 
2006, at 4 (noting that small public firms are disproportionately impacted by these higher 
costs). 
committee with a valuable service. At the same time, the audit 
committee would retain the independent control and review 
necessary to avoid managerial blocking and filtering of disclosures. 
Finally, the SEC might shield the audit committee from 
disclosures regarding de minimis or nonmaterial offenses. This 
limitation would ensure that directors preserve oversight over the 
most important information, but are not overburdened by 
insignificant complaints. The limits placed on such disclosures might 
include only reporting information to the audit committee that, if 
true, would necessitate public disclosure in light of previous public 
filings. Such a limit would essentially incorporate the definition of 
"materiality" from federal securities laws regulating public disclosure 
in other contexts. 
While these suggestions may give discretion to a non-director to 
filter whistleblower disclosures, the danger is minimized because 
independent directors would ultimately be responsible for the 
system. Unlike what occurred at Enron after Sherron Watkins 
reported misconduct to Ken Lay-where a corporate executive 
appointed a conflicted law firm to "investigate" the disclosures 342- 
under this proposal directors would be charged with appointing and 
supervising the review process. Directors, rather than corporate 
executives, would be responsible for determining what is "material" 
and what should be disclosed publicly. Moreover, such limitations 
may simply be a practical necessity for large corporations with tens of 
thousands of employees. 
Approving certain restrictions to the disclosure system could save 
corporations from implementing overly rigorous and inefficient 
structures in an attempt to satisfjr Sarbanes-Oxley's ambiguous 
mandate. For example, some corporations may not need all of the 
bells and whistles of a full ombudsman program and would benefit 
from the set cost of a third-party system. Currently, the vague nature 
of Sarbanes-Oxley might cause a corporation to install a system more 
extensive than is necessary to meet the statute's requirements. Such a 
system might ultimately be more comprehensive, but it may not 
provide any marginal benefit to the corporation or its employees. 
Providing absolute minimums for the disclosure channel permits a 
corporation to balance its need for directors to have time and energy 
to oversee the actual business activities of the corporation with the 
342. See srrpra text accompanying notes 65-68. 
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need to oversee Sarbanes-Oxley's requirement for a whistleblower 
disclosure system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recent corporate scandals demonstrated that, despite the efforts 
of a few employee whistleblowers, many corporate employees failed 
to report the misconduct they observed. Problems with information 
flow from employees to traditional corporate monitors undermined 
the ability of employees to perform any monitoring role effectively. 
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model presents an improved attempt 
to encourage corporate employees to overcome these flow-of- 
information problems. The Model should lead to more employee 
whistleblowing because it better corresponds with employee 
motivations and reduces the most prominent disincentives to 
whistleblowing. Also, the Model will likely improve the effectiveness 
of whistleblower disclosures because it encourages reporting directly 
to independent corporate directors who have the authority and 
responsibility to respond to information about wrongdoing. 
Though this better Model has limitations, those limitations can 
be addressed. The vagueness of Sarbanes-Oxley's requirements has 
the potential to both under- and over-produce whistleblower 
complaints. Like other attempts to implement effective compliance 
systems, it will be possible for corporations to utilize disclosure 
systems that are mere "window-dressing," thus resulting in too few 
whistleblower disclosures. Requiring corporations to publicly 
disclose information about their systems-and the results achieved 
through those systems-may reduce this cheating problem. 
Additionally, permitting some safe harbor for corporations that 
satisfjr a pre-approval process performed by an external entity may 
permit more external oversight of the effectiveness of whistleblower 
disclosure systems. 
Conversely, a direct channel to the board of directors may result 
in too many disclosures, overwhelming the directors. The SEC 
might first explicitly permit directors to outsource their oversight of 
the whistleblower disclosure channel as long as the responsibility for 
the channel remains with the directors. Next, the SEC could 
promulgate specific, approved restrictions and options to reduce the 
burden on directors while still facilitating the transfer of information 
about corporate misconduct from front-line employees to the 
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corporate monitors with the authority and responsibility to address 
the wrongdoing. 
These reforms will help Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model 
encourage employees to play an active role in monitoring corporate 
behavior-a role that not only benefits society by reducing corporate 
misconduct, but also improves corporate decision-making by 
increasing employee voice within the corporation. 
